






























About. The fo l lowing essays ref lect  on Professor Anne Dai-
ley’s chal lenge to the presumptions of rat ional i ty  in law in 
l ight of  a l l  we now know today about the unconscious. The 
authors draw from a wide array of  perspect ives ranging 
from the c lassroom to poetry.   
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On Law and the Unconscious 
 
A few years ago, I cotaught a seminar, “Law, Psychoanalysis, and 
Ideas of Human Agency,” with law professor and philosopher Martin J. 
Stone. Stone began the first class by making the claim that in the law, 
there are no persons, only relations between and among persons. This 
was a disturbing start to a course that, by its interest in psychoanalysis, 
seemed dedicated to some notion of personhood. I spent much time de-
bating whether or not Stone’s claim was true. 
I concluded, tentatively, that this claim was true of torts and con-
tracts and maybe even constitutional law—as “rights” seem to be primar-
ily about distances maintained among persons, and hence about rela-
tions rather than persons. But the claim failed in regard to criminal law 
and procedure, where there are persons—though of what kind is not so 
clear. What is personhood in criminal justice? I often find myself thinking 
of Judge John Noonan’s title, Persons and Masks of the Law.1 Most of-
ten, it seems, legal procedure provides masks, as in Greek comedy and 
tragedy: mere representations of persons rather than the fully developed 
individual. This is not surprising in that a deep interest in personal psy-
chology might disable the processes of law entirely. After all, Sigmund 
Freud, in his brief essay, “Criminals from a Sense of Guilt,” argued that 
perpetrators commit crimes because they are oppressed by a burden of 
guilt.2 Commission of the crime and the resulting punishment seem to 
 
1 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, 
AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS (1976). 
2 See 14 SIGMUND FREUD, Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work, in 
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 311, 332-
33 (E.C. Mayne trans., James Strachey rev. 1957). 
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them the only way to cope with guilt. Guilt before crime: that more or less 
stands criminology and penology on their heads. 
Robert Weisberg, in an essay some years back, asked the ques-
tion: what do we want our criminal suspects to be like?3 Do we want them 
to be “real people”? I don’t think so, at least not fully. We do not want to 
deal with them as interiorities. In illustration of this proposition, I would 
point to the incoherence of an opinion such as Miranda v. Arizona,4 which 
tries to protect the free will and voluntary choice of a subject considered 
vulnerable to the power of state policing yet, strangely, also capable of 
waiving the very rights that the Court wants to give him as protection 
against bad choices in relation to state power. The human person in Mi-
randa and most of its progeny appears a subject conceived as both ig-
norant and somehow so intelligent it can understand and defend against 
its ignorance. It is as if legal liberalism could not understand the realities 
of human agents in the law, both suspects and the police who handle 
them—or rather, found them too complex as persons to analyze fully their 
possible behaviors.  
I would refer the reader at this point to Justice O’Connor’s opinion 
for the Court in Oregon v. Elstad, which expressly states that the Court 
will not endow psychological conditions with constitutional implications.5 
She asserts further: “This Court has never held that the psychological 
impact of voluntary disclosure of a guilty secret qualifies as state com-
pulsion or compromises the voluntariness of a subsequent informed 
waiver.”6 This of course begs a number of the questions at issue: was 
the disclosure in fact voluntary? (Miranda doctrine would presume it was 
not.) Was the waiver voluntary? What is the status of a “guilty secret” in 
the law? Are we going to go there? Is it worth unpacking those two words 
and their psychological relation? 
 
3 Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small World of Legal Scholars, 
63 U. COLO. L. REV. 521 (1992). 
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
5 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 311 (1985). 
6 Id. at 312. 
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When the Court addressed these questions again in Missouri v. 
Seibert,7 Justice Kennedy invoked Justice O’Connor’s ban on psycho-
logical probing at oral argument. “These are—these are matters of psy-
chology that Elstad told us that we really should not be speculating 
about.”8 Yet Justice Souter, in his plurality opinion, does see a psycho-
logical inflection of constitutional rights in the so-called “Missouri Two-
Step” (viz. question first, warn after there is an admission): 
 
Upon hearing warnings only in the aftermath of interrogation 
and just after making a confession, a suspect would hardly 
think he had a genuine right to remain silent, let alone per-
sist in so believing once the police began to lead him over 
the same ground again. A more likely reaction on a sus-
pect’s part would be perplexity about the reason for discuss-
ing rights at that point, bewilderment being an unpromising 
frame of mind for knowledgeable decision.9  
 
While cast in the language of rights, derived from Miranda, Justice Souter 
describes an essentially psychological situation (“perplexity”, “bewilder-
ment”).10 Justice O’Connor’s dissent seizes upon this move, arguing that 
Elstad rejected such an approach: “We did so not because we refused to 
recognize the ‘psychological impact of the suspect’s conviction that he 
has let the cat out of the bag,’ but because we refused to ‘endo[w]’ those 
‘psychological effects’ with ‘constitutional implications.’”11 Justice O’Con-
nor (and not she alone, as Justice Souter’s opinion in Seibert now ap-
pears the outlier) blinds herself to the fact that, even if the Court may not 
want to enter the messy realm of psychology, police interrogators have 
long since happily set up shop there. They have studied carefully the 
 
7 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
8 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (No. 02-
1371). 
9 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 613 (footnote omitted). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 628 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 311). 
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ways in which suspects can be put in extreme psychological stress. They 
posit “guilty secrets” everywhere. The failure of the Court to follow police 
into the study of psychology seems both understandable and deeply per-
nicious. 
Anne Dailey’s Law and the Unconscious makes a powerful argu-
ment that we need to reconceive the relations of law and psychology and 
of psychoanalysis, and to end longstanding hostilities between them.12 
She has written a book of great cogency and importance that goes far 
beyond the standard quarrels that divide the two fields. She makes a 
reasoned and forceful case for psychoanalysis as coming to the aid of 
the law—not opposing it—in providing a richer account of human auton-
omy and responsibility. And she shows very effectively how psychoanal-
ysis could make a difference in such fields as child custody, surrogacy, 
pre-nuptial agreements, and duty-to-warn laws, all areas where greater 
nuance and depth in understanding human behavior and motive are im-
portant and desirable. The issue, as she sees it, is not that psychoanal-
ysis is irrelevant to law, but rather is too relevant. I agree wholeheartedly, 
while remaining unconvinced that the law understands this.  
Dailey argues that the law’s presumptions of rationality and trans-
parency need to be reconciled with what we know by way of psychoanal-
ysis about the true vectors of our inner lives and the complexities of hu-
man motivation. I am especially moved by how she applies these insights 
to our punitive and carceral society, which, she writes, needs to be “more 
modest in its certainty, more tentative in its judgment, and more compas-
sionate in its punishment.”13 That is very true. Having recently taught a 
course in a New Jersey prison, I feel even more strongly that our ideas 
of punishment and rehabilitation need to be rewritten on a clean slate. 
But I think for that to happen, law would have to give up a very central 
resistance to psychoanalytic insight; legal thought fears psychoanalytic 
 
12 ANNE C. DAILEY, LAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE (2017). 
13 Id. at 99. 
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thinking as essentially disabling of its performative speech and its finali-
ties—the psychoanalytic view of humans is one of incompletion and pro-
cess, and this the law cannot abide. 
That fact is why I am skeptical about a “reconciliation” between 
law and psychoanalysis in our criminal justice “system” (as it is laughably 
called). Law does not want to get into the subjectivities of those it pun-
ishes. It does not even want to police too much the caricatures of “volun-
tariness” that are produced daily, and nightly, in police precincts every-
where.  
There might be some slight hope on the rehabilitative side. There 
are some modest new signs of attention to the lives of the incarcerated, 
to the length of sentences, and especially to the importance of educa-
tional programs within prisons. I do not think the criminal law’s paradigm 
of personhood can ever accommodate psychoanalytic insight. But, per-
haps paradoxically, once it has put non-persons into prison cells, the lib-
eral belief in rehabilitation, in the possibility of human evolution, change, 
even enlightenment, can begin to make good on the lessons of psycho-













About. Peter Brooks is the Sterling Professor of Comparative Literature 
Emeritus at Yale University and author of Troubling Confessions: Speak-
ing Guilt in Law & Literature.
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Louis C.K. and Psychoanalytic Legal Thinking in the Age of 
#MeToo 
 
The law’s presumptions of rationality and free will can lead 
to devastating errors in judgment—the determination that 
confessions are true when they are not, the finding that con-
sent to sexual relations is present when it is not—as well as 
abandon individuals to live with the harsh consequences of 
their bad decisions without offering understanding, empa-
thy, or any real pathway to rehabilitation.1 
 
In the year since the publication of Anne Dailey’s luminous ac-
count of the value of psychoanalytic theory to the law, the #MeToo move-
ment has brought new visibility and urgency to a legal problem that Dai-
ley suggests “may prove amenable to psychoanalytic study,” namely 
sexual harassment.2 I first read Dailey’s book in the wake of the Harvey 
Weinstein revelations, and I write these words in the wake of the Brett 
Kavanaugh hearings. Between these events concerning men accused of 
and denying sexual assault, there appeared the New York Times head-
line, “Louis C.K. Is Accused by 5 Women of Sexual Misconduct.”3 The 
day following this disclosure, the comedian published a statement in the 
 
1 ANNE C. DAILEY, LAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE 225 (2017). 
2 Id. at 226. 
3 Melena Ryzik et al., Louis C.K. Is Accused by 5 Women of Sexual Misconduct, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/arts/television/louis-ck-sex-
ual-misconduct.html [https://perma.cc/UYC8 -BVG7]. 
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same paper acknowledging wrongdoing.4 In the remarks that follow, I will 
offer a psychoanalytic close-reading of Louis C.K.’s confession in order 
to show how some of the insights in Dailey’s book can be brought to bear 
on this well-known episode in entertainment history and in order to invite 
speculation about how a psychoanalytically informed jurisprudence 
might approach sexual-harassment law.  
Let me first pause to say that what I am calling psychoanalytic 
close-reading could just as easily be called literary close-reading. As Li-
onel Trilling pointed out long ago, Freud saw the mind as a “poetry-mak-
ing organ.”5 Recognizing that we “feel and think in figurative formations,” 
Freud discovered “in the very organization of the mind those mecha-
nisms by which art makes its effects, such devices as the condensations 
of meanings and the displacement of accent,” and he made psychoanal-
ysis “a science of tropes.”6 Psychoanalytic readings are therefore literary 
readings. The fact is worth dwelling on because it aligns with one of the 
important contributions of Dailey’s book. Dailey’s elucidation of the value 
of psychoanalysis to the law is on one level a defense of the humanities 
and an explanation of their importance to civic life. 
The Times article is remarkably tentative in defining exactly what 
Louis C.K. did wrong. It recounts that he masturbated within sight of three 
women, one of whom was in an office and two together in a hotel room, 
that he masturbated within hearing of a fourth, who was on the phone 
with him, and that, in a hallway at work, he asked to masturbate in front 
of a fifth, who refused his request.7 The article reports that the women in 
the hotel were “unsure whether what happened was criminal” but found 
the behavior “abusive.”8 “I think a line gets crossed when you take all 
 
4 Louis C.K., Louis C.K. Responds to Accusations: ‘These Stories Are True,’ N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/10/arts/television/louis-ck-state-
ment.html [https://perma.cc/T72Q-WV6R]. 
5 LIONEL TRILLING, Freud and Literature, in THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION: ESSAYS ON LITERATURE 
AND SOCIETY 34, 52 (1951). 
6 Id. at 53. 
7 Ryzik et al., supra note 3. 
8 Id. 
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your clothes off and start masturbating,” one of them is quoted as say-
ing.9 But no one explains what that line might be. 
Louis C.K.’s own account of what he did wrong is incoherent. 
Here is part of his statement: 
 
These stories are true. At the time, I said to myself that what 
I did was O.K. because I never showed a woman my dick 
without asking first, which is also true. But what I learned 
later in life, too late, is that when you have power over an-
other person, asking them to look at your dick isn’t a ques-
tion. It’s a predicament for them. The power I had over these 
women is that they admired me. And I wielded that power 
irresponsibly.10 
 
The sentences swing between self-condemnation and self-exculpation. 
Yes, I did what the five women have said I did. But I asked first for their 
consent. Granted, free consent would have been impossible for them to 
give, as we were then circumstanced, for my request was not a real ques-
tion. Here one expects to learn that the request was more sinister than a 
question, an act of coercion of some kind. Instead, the request gets de-
scribed with the relatively innocuous-sounding word “predicament,” a 
term emphasizing the free choice (and necessity for choice) of the person 
who faces it. In the meantime, Louis C.K. concedes that he had over 
these women something that rendered their ostensible consent unfree 
and invalid: power. But when the source of that power is defined, the 
quantity of power in question sounds negligible. His power stemmed not 
from any threat of or capacity for harmful action on his part but rather 
from an action of the women (admiring) that we do not normally think of 
as giving its object much sway over its subject. 
By the end of the passage quoted, Louis C.K. seems deliberately 
to exaggerate his negative assessment of his misbehavior in order to 
 
9 Id. 
10 Louis C.K., supra note 4. 
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invite contradiction. Self-condemnation is after all part of his shtick. He 
means, “I’m innocent, for the only power I had over my accusers is that 
they admired me”; he says, “their admiration and its results are precisely 
what made my behavior bad.” The self-reproach is absurd. If we forbid 
sexual overtures when one of the parties admires the other, we will have 
prohibited the sexual overtures that our culture most prizes. By the same 
token, we cannot forbid sexual overtures when one party has power over 
the other, for to be in love is to be subject to the power of the love object. 
At other moments, however, the subtext of Louis C.K.’s words 
suggests genuine self-condemnation. As we have seen, a person in a 
predicament is called upon precisely to answer the question of what is to 
be done. However, anyone with a little Latin will hear in the word “predic-
ament,” “pre-dicere”: pre-saying, what goes without saying or consent, 
predication. Indeed, the Latin origin is “praedicare,” to assert. On this in-
terpretation, Louis C.K.’s request was indeed a preclusion of choice, not 
a question but a foregone conclusion—and the start to an inevitable se-
quel. Although he asked before showing his dick, Louis C.K. confesses, 
the asking was not a question but a pre-dick-ament: under no circum-
stance would the dick be absent from what followed. Why not? One rea-
son might be that Louis C.K. was determined to go on with the self-ex-
posure whatever the response to his request. (In one case, however, we 
do know that a woman successfully rebuffed him.) Alternatively, what 
foreclosed any effective refusal was the speech act performed by the 
request itself. To ask a person to watch one masturbate is already to 
exhibit something to her that she might rather not see, already to draw 
her into a sexual relation she might rather avoid. Although the request 
can be answered in the negative, it cannot be unheard, and it has already 
changed the atmosphere between the two persons. The request to show 
his dick is a proleptic pre-showing, a pre-dick-ament that brings a sample 
of the very sexual relation that it claims to envision as one of two possible 
outcomes to the request. 
By contrast to “predicament,” the word “admire” consistently does 
the work of self-exculpation. Louis C.K. writes that “[t]he power I had over 
11
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these women is that they admired me. And I wielded that power irrespon-
sibly.”11 Louis C.K.’s power derived not from any threat of professional 
retaliation, but rather from the women’s mere admiration: a surprisingly 
mild word to account for the decisive effect it is supposed to have, namely 
the invalidation of consent. But consider again some etymology. Admire: 
from “mirari,” to wonder at, which is one letter off from “mirare,” to look 
at. “It was irresponsible for me to invite these women to look at me be-
cause they (already had) looked at me.” Nonsense! Or: “what made it 
culpable for me to ask them to watch me was the circumstance that they 
had (already had) a positive response to watching me.” More nonsense, 
though the underlying meaning is in each case easy to detect once you 
substitute “responsible” and “innocent” for “irresponsible” and “culpa-
ble”—the unconscious knows no negative12—and once you see that 
Louis C.K. associates his stand-up comedy routines, the performances 
that garnered the women’s admiration, with masturbatory display. He 
means, “I was justified in inviting them to look at—admire—me, because 
they already admired me: I was only inviting them to do what they already 
did.” If you consider the subject-matter of Louis C.K.’s comedy routines, 
namely personal material of a revealing, embarrassing sort, you can add, 
“it was no big deal for me to ask them to witness my indecent exposure, 
because they had already witnessed—and admired—my indecent expo-
sure.”  
Attempting to define his blameworthiness, Louis C.K. ends up 
question-begging in further, punning tautology. What rendered my po-
tency in that situation irresponsible was my power. What created the pre-
dick-ament was my potency. Blaming the victims, he proposes that the 
women’s admiration, their watching of him, has given him both the po-
tency for which he is now professing remorse and the potency that made 
the former culpable. Indeed, the context-activated pun in the avowal, “I 
wielded that power irresponsibly,” retracts the admission of guilt, for if to 
 
11 Id. 
12 See 19 SIGMUND FREUD, Negation, in STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 235 (Joan Riviere trans., James Strachey rev. 1961). 
12








wield power at all is to masturbate, then there was no avoiding mastur-
bation once the women’s admiration had bestowed the power. 
To be sure, the continuities run not just between Louis C.K.’s re-
peated misdeed and line of work (that of “stand-up comic,” a term sug-
gesting male excitation) but also between the work, the misdeed, the 
New York Times exposé, and the confession. Each brings shameful se-
crets to light. The kind of stand-up comedy Louis C.K. performs is full of 
confessions, and the masturbatory act is itself a confession of taboo de-
sire. Any confession is of course its own kind of performance, and the 
one in question is an exhibition offered before the New York Times’s vast 
international audience.  
How should we treat the public confession of a confessed exhibi-
tionist?13 Dailey describes a federal appellate judge who identified a de-
fendant as one of those “criminals from a sense of guilt” who, in Freud’s 
view, “commit criminal acts in order to obtain the satisfaction of punish-
ment for some earlier crime—real or imagined.”14 The judge “reversed a 
criminal conviction on this ground, holding that the defendant had acted 
from an unconscious desire to be apprehended and punished.”15 Bent on 
denying the criminal his desire for punishment, the court refused to be 
enlisted to satisfy the wish that had prompted the errant behavior. Should 
a confession that partakes in the exhibitionism and equivocal self-degra-
dation that it confesses meet a similar resistance? 
Perhaps such a confession’s assessment of the harm done the 
victims should be taken with extra skepticism. Here is the continuation of 
Louis C.K.’s statement:  
 
I have been remorseful of my actions. And I’ve tried to learn 
from them. And run from them. Now I’m aware of the extent 
of the impact of my actions. I learned yesterday the extent 
 
13 For a discussion of this question as its concerns Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Confes-
sions, see PETER BROOKS, TROUBLING CONFESSIONS: SPEAKING GUILT IN LAW AND LITERA-
TURE 20-21, 49-52 (2000). 
14 DAILEY, supra note 1, at 115. 
15 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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to which I left these women who admired me feeling badly 
about themselves and cautious around other men who 
would never have put them in that position. I also took ad-
vantage of the fact that I was widely admired in my and their 
community, which disabled them from sharing their story 
and brought hardship to them when they tried because peo-
ple who look up to me didn’t want to hear it. I didn’t think that 
I was doing any of that because my position allowed me not 
to think about it. There is nothing about this that I forgive 
myself for. And I have to reconcile it with who I am. Which 
is nothing compared to the task I left them with. I wish I had 
reacted to their admiration of me by being a good example 
to them as a man and given them some guidance as a co-
median, including because I admired their work. 
The hardest regret to live with is what you’ve done 
to hurt someone else. And I can hardly wrap my head 
around the scope of hurt I brought on them. I’d be remiss to 
exclude the hurt that I’ve brought on people who I work with 
. . . .16 
 
Some commentators have faulted Louis C.K. for omitting to apologize in 
his statement, but to me this sounds very apologetic. So eager is Louis 
C.K. to show remorse and understanding of the harm he has caused that 
he exaggerates that harm, at least to my ear. The Times exposé says 
nothing about any of the victims becoming cautious around other men. It 
does say that one of the accusers, the one who never saw his exhibition, 
felt discouraged and left comedy, that one felt shame, and that two others 
lost work opportunities because their attempt to spread the word of Louis 
C.K.’s misbehavior alienated potential employers and colleagues. To de-
scribe these harms as comprising a scope of hurt so broad as to be diffi-
cult to contemplate seems extravagant, as does the suggestion that 
Louis C.K. has left his victims with a task immeasurably greater than his 
 
16 Louis C.K., supra note 4. 
14








own project of self-reconciliation. The guilt described here seems dis-
placed. Its real objects are perhaps the persons to whom the rest of the 
paragraph refers: the family members mortified by the exposé and con-
fession, the partners whose projects would soon be abruptly cancelled. 
Those harms are an effect of the publicity, not an immediate effect of the 
crime, much as the professional harm suffered by the two women derived 
not from the exhibition itself but from the repercussions of their exposure 
of it to the reluctant knowledge of others.  
 In her discussion of prenuptial agreements, Dailey lends sup-
port from psychoanalytic theory to the idea that people on the cusp of 
marriage tend to be out of their minds, and that they should not be held 
to the ruinous prenuptial agreements they sign—if on the face of it the 
agreements seem unfair.17 Leaving aside the possibility that having just 
been exposed as an exhibitionist in the newspaper of record might create 
conditions that cancel the voluntariness of the accused’s confession, it 
would be well if courts understood that any confession, like any prenup-
tial agreement, is likely to be offered under conditions of stress, if not 
duress, and that any confession should be searched, not just for fairness, 
but for what Dailey, following Peter Brooks, calls “narrative truth.”18 Dai-
ley remarks, “[W]here state of mind is an issue, law necessarily stakes 
its claim to truth on the construction of convincing narratives.”19 It seems 
to me that the Louis C.K. confession does not meet this standard. It does 
contain a straightforward admission that the accusations are true, but as 
we have seen, it is inconsistent in its assessment of whether the actions 
were culpable, and it offers no very persuasive account of the harm done. 
 
17 DAILEY, supra note 1, at 139. 
18 Narrative truth is “‘a matter of conviction, derived from the plausibility and well-formed-
ness of the narrative discourse, and also from what we might call its force, its power to 
create further patterns of connectedness, its power to persuade us that things must have 
happened this way, since here lies the only explanatory narrative, the only one that will 
make sense of things.’” Id. at 35 (quoting PETER BROOKS, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND STORY-
TELLING 59 (1994)).  On confessions as “inherently unstable and unreliable,” see BROOKS, 
supra note 13, at 23, 52, 63-64.  
19 Id. at 36. 
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 Granted, Louis C.K. faced a court of public opinion rather than a 
court of law. But the immediate aftermath—cancellations of all of his 
deals, opprobrium—strikes me as a reaction that does not demonstrate 
what Dailey calls, brilliantly, “good-enough judging.”20 The punishment 
evinces a most credulous and literal-minded taking-seriously of his own 
assessment of the harm he caused, an assessment which far exceeds in 
severity the grievances expressed by any of the victims quoted in the 
Times.21 If a confession such as Louis C.K.’s were to appear in a court 
of law, I hope that the judge would read it closely, with an eye to its im-
plicit self-defenses as well as its explicit self-accusations, for some of the 
self-defenses may be partially exculpatory and some of the self-accusa-
tions may be too harsh. 
Let me acknowledge that I bridle at the idea that the exhibitions 
and solicitations Louis C.K. made should be taken to have been particu-
larly harmful in themselves. I except here the case of the woman then in 
her early twenties who was working “in production” while Louis C.K. was 
a producer and writer on the same program, and who did consent, after 
repeated requests, to watch him.22 It is easy to see that she was his sub-
ordinate, that the requests felt coercive, that her acceptance drew her 
into an upsetting secret complicity with him. But the other cases seem 
different. It is true that people vary in their responses. What Person A 
 
20 Id. at 33, 37. For an account of the standard for mothering upon which “good-enough 
judging” plays, see D.W. WINNICOTT, PLAYING AND REALITY (1971). 
21 Arguably, Louis C.K.’s confession is so arranged as to make his acts not seem prose-
cutable. As Christina Cauterucci points out, he emphasizes his requests for consent, 
even though in the case of the woman on the telephone, he never did ask consent, and 
meanwhile he does not say that he obtained express consent. See Christina Cauterucci, 
Louis C.K.’s Public Statement Unnervingly Misunderstands the Concept of Consent, 
SLATE (Nov. 10, 2017), https://slate.com/human 
-interest/2017/11/louis-c-k-s-masturbation-statement-unnervingly-misunderstands-the-
concept-of-consent.html [https://perma.cc/73UG-9Z7T]. As for the in-person rather than 
telephonic performances, we know that in one case he did obtain consent, in one case 
he did not (and refrained from the display), and in one case he made the exhibition after 
the two women had “laughed off” his request. See Louis C.K., supra note 4; Ryzik et al., 
supra note 3. 
22 Ryzik et al., supra note 3. 
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finds traumatic might not seem so to Person B. But one thing that makes 
this case so interesting is that the victims do not seem particularly vul-
nerable. In the remaining four instances, Louis C.K. was not a supervisor 
or even a consistent coworker. (The woman who refused in the hallway 
was a guest star on a show he was working on.) Among these four, we 
find one woman who refused his request with indignation; one woman on 
the phone with him, aware of what he was doing but uncomfortably not 
hanging up; and two women wrapped in their winter coats, “holding onto 
each other, screaming and laughing in shock,” and then leaving the 
room.23 He was the outnumbered and naked one.  
Indeed, it is possible to detect in his exhibition more self-abase-
ment than aggression. The act would seem to surrender rather than to 
seize power, to disempower the perpetrator, to make him vulnerable, to 
put him at the mercy of his viewers, who might for example tell on him, 
shame him. (As we know, the women in coats did try to tell on him, and 
they suffered for it. Much as the mob boss or absolute monarch gives 
orders while seated on the toilet, Louis C.K. made of show of defense-
lessness that ultimately demonstrated his invulnerability and impervious-
ness to being shamed. But the women did not know this would happen 
while they were watching.) The four victims were grown women and pro-
fessional comedians. Their chosen career advantages knowingness, so-
phistication, worldliness, and sexual experience in particular. When Louis 
C.K. makes an idiot of himself from across the room, across the tele-
phone wire, or in the hallway with a verbal request turned down, they are 
the ones harmed? To think so risks accepting the idea that women are 
polluted by sexual knowledge. Psychoanalysis has been good for femi-
nism not least by reducing the stigma attached to sex and sexual aware-
ness. The notion that it is necessarily traumatic for a woman to see or to 
contemplate seeing a man masturbating is, I fear, a step in the wrong 
direction. Of course, there are other harms than trauma, and because a 
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knowledge and experience, women and their reputations are subject to 
wounding by a comic’s possibly comical sexual display. 
If they are to be effective, the adjustments to sexual-harassment 
law that will follow our current ferment will have to reckon intelligently with 
gender. It is no accident that the recent focus in the news on sexual har-
assment and assault has brought with it a new eagerness on all sides to 
emphasize gender difference. Following the Harvey Weinstein scandal, 
John Kelly, then chief of staff in the Trump administration, complained, 
“Women were sacred,”24 and Joe Biden, former vice president in the 
Obama administration, reminisced, “My father taught me that the great-
est sin was the abuse of power: mental, physical, or economic. The car-
dinal sin was for a man to use his power to abuse a woman or a child. It 
is disgusting.”25 For Biden, a man and a woman represent an automatic, 
maximal power differential. If Biden agrees with the many commentators 
who have recently implied that the sheer existence of a large power dif-
ferential entails a consent-demolishing threat of coercion, then it is un-
clear that for Biden any woman could ever give valid consent to a man’s 
offer of anything. More unexpectedly, feminists are also taking inequality 
between men and women as a given. The implied source of the inequality 
is not always clear. It could be the difference in physical strength, the 
differently applied stigma attached to sex, or the fact that men still hold a 
majority of positions of power. The astonishing recent slogan, “Believe 
all women” makes some sense if one reads it together with its successor, 
“I believe the survivors.” One can “believe all women” if, looking beyond 
the individual instance a given woman describes, one takes all women to 
be survivors of systematic of sexual misconduct.  
 
24 Emma Gray & Dana Liebelson, John Kelly Is Sad Women Are No Longer ‘Sacred.’ 
Women Are Not  
That Sad, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/john-kelly-
women-sacred-humans_n_59e91025e4b0df10767be25e [https://perma.cc/VE7Z-
4UBG] (emphasis added). 
25 Alanna Vagianos, Joe Biden Condemns Harvey Weinstein’s ‘Disgusting Behavior,’ 
HUFFPOST (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/joe-biden-condemns-harvey-
weinstein_n_59de61ffe4b0eb18af05ada9 [https:// perma.cc/DU5D-H78E]. 
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 Henry Sumner Maine famously remarked in 1861 that “the 
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement 
from Status to Contract.”26 Perhaps our society is now moving back in 
the direction of status. We seem to be finding more and more reasons 
not to hold people to their words—to their consent to contracts, to their 
confessions. Historians have shown how contingent are our deeply held 
beliefs about what constitutes valid consent. Confessions used to be con-
sidered valid even when—and in the case of enslaved persons in ancient 
Greece and the Roman Republic, only when—they had been obtained 
by torture.27 Deeds for the sale of land and contracts binding one party 
to a period of servitude used to be considered valid even when they had 
been extorted by the other party to the agreement through violence or 
imprisonment.28 Nor has youth always invalidated contracts. The histo-
rian Holly Brewer points out that “[i]n sixteenth-century England, children 
over the age seven were of ‘ripe age’ to marry . . . . Four-year-olds could 
make wills to give away their goods and chattels. Children of any age 
could bind themselves into apprenticeships.”29 According to Brewer, it 
was the Protestant Reformation, with its emphasis on internal choice of 
church membership, that led people to ponder seriously the idea that 
certain conditions, such as the consenter’s freedom from coercion and 
attainment of what would later be called the “age of reason,” might be 
necessary to an act of consent’s validity.30 
Today, our notions of consent seems to be changing at break-
neck speed. I am perhaps in a special position to notice this, because I 
teach the eighteenth-century novel. Passages that my students identify 
as rape scenes were, in my student days, regarded simply as sex 
 
26 HENRY JAMES SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 100 (1917) (emphasis omitted). 
27 See A. Lawrence Lowell, The Judicial Use of Torture. Part I., 11 HARV. L. REV. 220, 220 
(1897). 
28 See HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT: CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY 239, 243 (2005). 
29 Id. at 1. 
30 See id. at 8. 
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scenes. But anyone can sense a paradigm shift taking place when noting 
the pace at which new sexual-harassment scandals unfold during a mo-
ment that many people seem to agree is special, a marker of a new era, 
maybe a herald of better things to come. Clearly, the larger culture has 
grasped the psychoanalytic idea that “free consent” can be an illusion, 
that, as Dailey puts it, there is a “gap between law’s presumption of ra-
tionality and the reality of subjective life.”31 Commentators are finding 
more and more kinds of speech that should be discounted. Not just, 
“don’t believe the consenting words of minors and people deemed psy-
chotic,” but also, “don’t believe an employee’s ostensible consent to the 
sexual solicitation of her boss.” Perhaps we should add: “don’t believe 
the confessions of a stand-up comic; don’t believe the exhibitions of an 
exhibitionist.” These phrases consort strangely with “Believe all women,” 
but they share with the slogan a common emphasis on the category to 
which the speaker belongs, even as they threaten to treat all those whose 
words are dismissed as children. The rumblings that one cannot validly 
consent to sex with one’s boss, or with any person who has power over 
oneself, or with anyone who is simply more successful in one’s profes-
sion, or anyone with more influence, or anyone who is a man if one is 
oneself a woman, seem to revert us to an older, apparently less free, 
system of political membership or legal position, where agency is based 
not on contract but on status, not on what one agrees to but on one’s 
social role.  
Some of the questions I would address to Dailey are the following. 
In a better, less sexist and sexphobic world, would all of Louis C.K.’s 
alleged transgressions, including the declined and dropped request, still 
look wrong? What difference does sex make to harassment? How, in 
other words, should we distinguish between Louis C.K.’s primary mis-
deed and that of a man who calls a woman colleague aside to drone on 
to her about a boring part of his life—another kind of self-exposure that 
may be unwelcome and inconsiderate of her preferences, but one that is 
 
31 DAILEY, supra note 1, at 225. 
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not considered newsworthy or punishable? We sometimes—but not al-
ways—have the feeling that if sexuality is involved, then it is not really 
about us. “I thought I was a friend and here I am later, just another piece 
of meat,” complained the former model who accused George Takei of 
having sexually assaulted him in the 1980s.32 One could argue that a 
harm of sexual solicitations is that they can erase one’s individuality and 
make one interchangeable with others. Louis C.K. implied as much when 
he called after the two women as they fled, “Which one is Dana and which 
one is Julia?”33 If this is so, how does it bear on workplace harassment, 
given that work is where in most cases you are supposed to be inter-
changeable with someone else, and where you are valued in any case 
not as an end-in-yourself but as an instrument, as a means to the end of 
production, though not of a colleague’s pleasure? How might sexual-har-
assment law refuse the belief that there is something especially degrad-
ing about sex but acknowledge that sex still carries an extra stigma for 
women? What should we think of the assumption common in today’s cli-
mate of opinion that women generally need protection from men (despite 
newsworthy predatory behavior alleged of women)? If indeed we are cur-
rently witnessing the rise of status at the expense of contract, is that a 
good thing? Can we help ensure that it will become a good thing if we 
use psychoanalysis to refine our status categories? What more, in short, 






About.  Sarah Raff is an Associate Professor of English at Pomona Col-
lege. 
 
32 Halle Kiefer, George Takei Accused of Sexually Assaulting Actor in 1981, VULTURE 
(Nov. 10, 2017), https:// www.vulture.com/2017/11/george-takei-accused-of-sexually-as-
saulting-actor-in-1981.html [https://perma.cc /K9HK-N4QJ]. 
33 Ryzik et al., supra note 3. 
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ELYN R. SAKS 
Book Review: Law and the Unconscious 
 
I’m honored and delighted to be giving this commentary on Anne 
Dailey’s Law and the Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective. Dailey 
and I have a lot of common interests, and it is wonderful for a psychoan-
alytically trained person such as myself to get to see another psychoan-
alytically trained person put psychoanalytic concepts to such good use in 
the legal arena.   
Dailey’s “Law and the Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspec-
tive,” is an excellent account of how psychoanalytic understandings can 
inform law in many dimensions. She speaks of “formulating abstract rules 
that reflect the reality of psychoanalytic experiences and identify when 
the law should take account of the granular characteristics of the individ-
ual.” 
Dailey notes that law and psychoanalysis are both humanistic dis-
ciplines and share an ideal of human flourishing. She focuses on the 
main drivers of our psychological lives—love and aggression—and so 
looks at criminal behavior and family relations. More specifically, Dailey 
looks at the law of crimes; intimate contracts (prenuptial agreements and 
surrogacy contracts); violent threats; sexual choice; and children’s rights. 
Dailey complexifies the issues she looks at. Law tends to look at 
the “reasonable person.”1 And when it looks at actual subjective intent, it 
 
1 See e.g., Mayo Moran, Symposium: Who is the Reasonable Person? The Reasonable 
Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
1233 (2010).  
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often also utilizes objective standards—for instance, it insists that “a per-
son intends the natural and probable consequences of his or her act.”2 
Psychoanalysis, by contrast, wants to know about this same per-
son’s mind by seeking out his actual goals and values, his conflicts, and 
the unconscious thoughts and feelings that are motivating his behavior. 
Of course, we can’t put every person whose choice is at issue on 
the couch and analyze his deep and profound motives. But the law can 
take account of likely dynamics behind important choices. And it can de-
sign its interventions in a way that does not trigger or exploit these. 
As just one example that Dailey discusses, let us think about con-
fessions. The law tends to presume that confessions are acts of con-
scious, voluntary choice that are very probative of guilt—why on earth 
would one confess to something one didn’t do? As Dailey points out, 
though, one might confess for a variety of unconscious reasons: one 
feels unconscious guilt about some other act or feeling and displaces it 
onto this crime (Freud even suggests that guilt over sexual feelings as a 
child toward one’s parents might be at work); one has an unconscious 
need to be punished, so that confession and punishment serves one’s 
unconscious masochistic needs and traits; one might want to please the 
interrogator. Other motives also might exist; for example, one might want 
to bring ignominy on one’s family because one feels neglected by them. 
Again, many of these may be outside conscious awareness. 
Dailey points out three interrogation tactics that might especially 
lead to coerced or false confessions: becoming overly friendly with the 
accused so he thinks you are on his side (“false sympathy”); degradation 
that stimulates unconscious self-destructive urges by creating a relation-
ship with sadomasochistic undertones; and trickery. While Dailey does 
 
2 People v. Farrell, 89 III. App. 3d 262 (1980); People v. Conley, 187 III. App. 3d 234 
(1989); Michael G. Heyman, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine: A Case 
Study in Failed Law Reform, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 388 (2010). 
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not rule out such tactics altogether, she does think they should be used 
in a temperate way so as not to override the “will” of the confessor. 
Another example Dailey addresses is the so-called Tarasoff duty: 
that potential victims of your patient may need to be warned.3 Dailey uses 
this example to tease out the law’s posture of transparency versus psy-
choanalysis’ posture of opacity.   
And so some jurisdictions have a bright-line rule that if your pa-
tient makes an actual threat, you have to warn.4  And she points out that 
even in jurisdictions that don’t have this rule, therapists might expect that 
juries will find she should have predicted danger if the patient had made 
a threat and then acts out.  
Dailey uses psychoanalytic understandings of possible meanings 
of threats to underscore that this rule is problematic. The patient may be 
communicating things other than wanting literally to kill the victim. The 
patient might want psychologically to be rid of the victim, to put him out 
of mind, or to prevent anyone else from having him. He may also be 
wanting to trigger strong countertransference feelings in the therapist. 
So a bright-line rule gives the analyst no discretion or authority to 
try to understand and interpret the threat. This will likely mean you are 
going to very much over-predict violence, destroy the analyst-patient re-
lationship, and possibly lead to more violence in the future as patients 
won’t be able to get help with their upsetting thoughts and feelings.   
Other similar examples show Dailey as a person with premier 
psychoanalytic understandings of human behavior. She is great at un-
covering the unconscious motives of people in various contexts. For ex-
ample, why would someone sign a prenuptial agreement that disad-
vantages him or her? Or consent to give up a baby who one is surrogate 
for? 
 
3 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 
(1976). 
4 See David G. Jensen, The Tarasoff Two-Step, THE THERAPIST 44 (2012).   
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Dailey’s recommendations tend to be to not just blindly enforce a 
contract, but to try to formulate rules that take account of our decisional 
frailties, by, for instance, suggesting certain presumptions in such cases. 
Of course there is a vast expanse between fully objective stand-
ards and fully subjective standards, especially if we countenance uncon-
scious motives as well. If it is hard to get inside a person’s conscious 
mind, it is near impossible to get into her unconscious mind. How do we 
establish or falsify a claim of an unconscious motive? 
Dailey straddles this divide quite well. She wants our psychoana-
lytic understandings to inform rules and policies that are workable. Take 
confessions, for example. Dailey recommends against rules or policies 
that allow interrogations to overly stress a person’s ability to make a rea-
soned choice whether to confess. 
A few other thoughts about Dailey’s project: First, if we are going 
to import psychological ideas into the law, why psychoanalytic ideas? 
Dailey does discuss this some—arguing that cognitive psychology’s use 
in our law could be well supplemented by psychoanalytic ideas.  But why 
psychoanalytic ideas, particularly in a climate in which many think psy-
choanalysis has been debunked? (I don’t agree with this view, but it is 
out there.) 
And then there is the question of which psychoanalytic ideas or 
theories? Professor Dailey does compare and contrast some of the main 
different schools—for instance, Kleinian psychoanalysis and relational 
theories no less than classical psychoanalysis—but I would have liked to 
hear more about which theories and why. And given the multiplicity of 
psychoanalytic theories, how is the law to decide which theory to rely 
upon? 
Also, I am not totally convinced that the unconscious doesn’t re-
ally stress us beyond our breaking point. Take informed consent. If a pa-
tient says he is consenting to surgery because he believes the doctor is 
God and will omnipotently cure him, we would say he was incompetent 
to make this decision. 
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But what if he unconsciously believes this? (Indeed, many ana-
lysts would probably say this is the rule rather than the exception.) If that 
was his reason for deciding, why isn’t this choice incompetent too? 
One could say that he will have had a conscious reason for his 
decision too, and if there is at least one competent reason for the choice, 
that is enough. But does this make sense? I can imagine two conscious 
reasons, one OK and one radically incompetent. We might say the in-
competent choice might be the real reason. Indeed, a powerful enough 
delusion could overwhelm the decision-maker. Also, partly for that rea-
son, we might want to endorse the view that if there are two reasons for 
a choice, both must be competent. If this scenario is at all common, it 
would totally undermine our concept that we are, most of us, most of the 
time, competent deciders. 
A not very satisfactory response is that the proof problems around 
unconscious motivations are too severe for us to be able to identify these 
motivations, so the law must simply rule out unconscious motivation. This 
makes practical sense but is not very satisfying theoretically (or psycho-
logically). 
Another major problem with importing psychoanalytic theories 
into the law is that they are underdeterminative of policy. Take the case 
of child custody. One prominent psychoanalytic theory says that the 
child’s relationship with her primary, psychological parent is paramount, 
and that this parent must be perceived by the child as powerful and help-
ful. And this means that the custodial parent should be able to bar the 
other parent from visitation altogether. In other words, the child’s perceiv-
ing the parent to have this power is important to her psychological well-
being. 
But another psychological theory says that the child’s having a 
relationship with both parents, even if they are at odds with each other, 
is important for her wellbeing, and courts should grant shared custody or 
visitation to both parents, even if the primary custodial parent doesn’t 
want this and thinks it is bad for the child. So turning to psychoanalytic 
theory is not going to lead us to determinate rules in many cases. 
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Also, even if one stance would be better for the child, there are 
interests beyond the child’s that are at stake—namely those of the par-
ents. She has needs and wants of her own that are entitled to some def-
erence and respect. 
So the normative question—how to balance the child’s needs, 
rights, and interests against the parents’—cries out for exploration. But it 
will not be settled by psychoanalysis—this is a question for law, not doc-
tors. 
Another point is that, as Dailey has noted, there are other areas 
of law and mental health that would benefit from a psychoanalytic explo-
ration of the different issues at stake. I hope Dailey intends to continue 
looking at legal rules in different contexts from a psychoanalytic view—
that hers is just a beginning of important conversations, and that others 
will undertake them as well. 
And a final point is to recommend to Dailey, in another project, 
that she look at the concept of capacity itself. She more or less presumes 
competency—she wants to give people maximal choice consistent with 
their frailties—and it would be useful to think about how psychoanalysis 
bears on the capacity question itself.   
Indeed, psychoanalytic ideas may be most disruptive of our way 
of seeing things in the context of capacity determinations. And so the 
capacity question may itself be the most urgent to ponder in this context. 
So, just to summarize: why psychoanalysis? Why a particular ver-
sion of psychoanalysis? Can we really avoid or manage the problem of 
unconscious motivation? What is our response to the idea or fact that 
psychoanalysis can be used to justify policies that are completely at odds 
with each other? And how shall we understand the concept of capacity 
in psychoanalytic terms? 
In conclusion, Anne Dailey’s book is a deep and subtle explora-
tion of the intersection between law and psychoanalysis, and I highly rec-
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NOMI M. STOLZENBERG 
As If: Anne Dailey and the New Fictionalism 
 
Originally published in German in 1899, Die Traumdeutung, soon 
thereafter translated into English as The Interpretation of Dreams, 
launched what its author, Sigmund Freud, called “psychoanalysis,” a 
term that was used for the first time in that publication.1  Within a few 
decades, Freud had become a household name and his ideas had per-
colated into the general culture, radically transforming popular as well as 
medical conceptions of sexuality and memory, among many other facets 
of the human mind and behavior.  Even after an extensive period of 
“Freud-bashing” which commenced in the 1970s, during which psychoa-
nalysis and Freud himself were lambasted for a variety of sins,2 he re-
mains, in the immortal words of W.H. Auden, “no more a person now than 
 
1 SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (A.A. Brill trans., MacMillan Co. 1913) 
(1899) (first English translation).  
2 The oceans of ink spilled on the subject have spared no aspect of Freud’s work. See, 
e.g., HENRI ELLENBERGER, THE DISCOVERY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE HISTORY AND EVOLU-
TION OF DYNAMIC PSYCHIATRY (1970) (arguing that Freud exaggerated claims of “curing” 
his patients); JOHN C. FARRELL, FREUD’S PARANOID QUEST: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND MODERN 
SUSPICION (1998) (declaring Freud’s self-denigrating humor to be a “communicable dis-
ease” infecting intellectual thought); ADOLF GRÜNBAUM, THE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHOANAL-
YSIS (1984) (questioning empirical support of psychoanalysis); FRANK SULLOWAY, FREUD, 
BIOLOGIST OF THE MIND: BEYOND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC LEGEND (1979) (calling Freud a 
“crypto-biologist” whose ideas were simply “an epitome of the late-nineteenth century 
[evolutionary] vision of man put forth by so many of his forgotten contemporaries”); ELIZ-
ABETH M. THORNTON, THE FREUDIAN FALLACY: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF FREUDIAN THEORY 
(1984) (viciously critiquing Freud’s theories as the result of cocaine addiction).  The most 
vocal and persistent critic of Freud is Frederick Crews, who began his attack with a series 
of articles published starting in 1980 and continuing throughout the 1980s, 1990s and up 
to the present day with his recently published biography.  FREDERICK CREWS, FREUD: THE 
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a whole climate of opinion.”3  Gone are the days of Mad Men when having 
an analyst was a standard accoutrement of upper middle class life, like 
having a piano, and a Freudian vocabulary was on every educated per-
son’s lips.  Yet Freud is not so much forgotten (though he is discredited 
in certain circles) as he is now so fundamental that the ideas he popular-
ized (the formative influence of childhood, repression and the uncon-
scious, to name just a few) are no longer attributed to any particular 
thinker or school of thought.  They are just part of the intellectual furniture 
in the house of ideas in which we all live. 
 In 1911, just a little more than ten years after the publication of 
The Interpretation of Dreams and around the time Freud’s ideas were 
first being popularized,4 another book was published in German, which 
also had a significant influence on the intellectual culture of that time.5  
Titled Die Philosophie des Als Ob, (in English, The Philosophy of ‘As If’),6 
this book was actually first published as a dissertation, in 1877,7 the year 
that Freud, then a medical student at the University of Vienna, moved to 
Ernst Brucke’s physiology laboratory where he studied the brains of hu-
mans and other animals.8  This was twelve years before The Interpreta-
 
MAKING OF AN ILLUSION (2017).  See, e.g., Frederick C. Crews, Analysis Terminable, 70 
COMMENTARY 25 (1980); The Revenge of the Repressed, Parts I and II, NEW YORK REVIEW 
OF BOOKS (1994); The Verdict on Freud, 7 PSYCH. SCIENCE (1996) THE NEW YORK REVIEW 
OF BOOKS  
3 W.H. Auden, In Memory of Sigmund Freud, in ANOTHER TIME (1940). 
4 See Dean Rapp, The Early Discovery of Freud By the British General Educated Public, 
1912-1919, 3 SOC. HIST. MED. 217(1990). 
5 That same year saw the publication in Paris by French philosopher and legal theorist 
Rene Berthelot of UN ROMANISME UTILITAIRE: ETUDE SUR LE MOUVEMENT, another work 
that, like “the philosophy of as if,” expressed the pragmatist spirit of the time.  See Richard 
Rorty, Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS 
ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW AND CULTURE (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998).  
6 Hans Vaihinger, DIE PHILOSOPHIE DES ALS OB: SYSTEM DER THEORETISCHEN, PRAKTISCHEN 
UND RELIGIÖSEN FIKTIONEM DER MENSCHHEIT AUF GRUND EINES IDEALISTICHEN POSITIVISMUS 
(1911).  
7 See Arthur Fine, Fictionalism, 18 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 1, 3 (1993). 
8 See, e.g., PETER GAY, FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME 32-33, 106 (1988); ADAM PHILLIPS, 
BECOMING FREUD: THE MAKING OF A PSYCHOANALYST 61, 69 (2014). 
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tion of Dreams was published, and eight years before Freud started work-
ing on that transformative book.  Written by a young German philosopher 
by the name of Hans Vaihinger, The Philosophy of ‘As If’ also was a study 
of the human mind, though one that focused strictly on the questions of 
cognitive psychology that are the shared terrain of psychology and phi-
losophy.  How do people know things?  What does human knowledge 
consist of?  Are people capable of knowing anything at all?  Subtitled “A 
System of the Theoretical, Practical, and Religious Fictions of Mankind,” 
Vaihinger’s work answered these questions by putting forth the theory 
that objective knowledge of reality is not attainable, but that we can attain 
a kind of knowledge that is practically useful and sufficiently reliable to 
be treated as if it is true.  All thought, according to Vaihinger, consists of 
idealizations or presumptions that we treat as if they are true, even 
though we lack the ability to verify them.  Facts, in other words, are fic-
tions.  The fiction lies not necessarily in their falsehood, but rather, in the 
unwarranted degree of certainty we assign to what are merely infer-
ences, which is the only way of knowing things we have and which are, 
at best, only probably true. 
 Vaihinger’s theory of “fictionalism,” as this philosophy is some-
times known,9 captured the attention of European and American intellec-
tuals in the early decades of the twentieth century.  His reception in Amer-
ican and English philosophical circles can largely be credited to C.K. 
Ogden, an Englishman who translated Vaihinger’s magnum opus and 
published the English translation in 1924, just a little more than a decade 
after the original book took German intellectual circles by storm.10  Best 
known as the co-author with I.A. Richards of The Meaning of Meaning, 
which ushered in New Criticism,11 Ogden was an eccentric scholar who 
dedicated most of his life to the promotion of Basic English, an 850-word 
 
9 See, e.g., Fine, supra note 7. 
10 Hans Vaihinger, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ‘AS IF”: A SYSTEM OF THE THEORETICAL, PRACTICAL, 
AND RELIGIOUS FICTIONS OF MANKIND (C.K. Ogden trans., 1924) (1911).  
11 C.K. & I.A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF MEANING: A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF LANGUAGE 
UPON THOUGHT AND OF THE SCIENCE OF SYMBOLISM (1927). 
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“controlled language,” not unlike Esperanto, which he invented and be-
lieved was destined to become a universal language and bring about 
world peace.12  He also devoted much of his time to editing and translat-
ing works on the philosophy of mind, which shared the common theme 
of criticizing philosophical realism (the doctrine that things exist inde-
pendently of our perceptions of them) and the correspondence theory of 
truth (according to which true statements are accurate reflections of 
things as they actually exist).  All of the thinkers that Ogden promoted 
rejected the correspondence theory in favor of the essentially pragmatist 
view that the only criteria for validating beliefs are utility and probability.  
In 1922, two years before he published his English translation of 
Vaihinger’s work, Ogden assisted F.P. Ramsey with producing an Eng-
lish translation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.13  Eight 
years after he brought out his translation of Vaihinger’s Philosophy of ‘As 
If,’ Ogden published a posthumous collection of Bentham’s writings on 
the role of fictions in human thought.  Composed of scraps of paper Ben-
tham had left behind, which Ogden pieced together and assembled into 
a book, Bentham’s Theory of Fictions (the title Ogden bestowed on it) is 
arguably Ogden’s theory more than Bentham’s.14  Whether Bentham 
held the full-blown philosophy of fictionalism that Ogden attributed to him 
 
12 Curiously, there appears to be no writing on the history of Basic English, notwithstand-
ing a spate of books on other constructed languages, such as Esperanto.  On Ogden’s 
Basic English project, as well as his “Benthamania,” see James E. Crimmins and K.E. 
Garay, The C.K. Ogden Papers at McMaster University: Bibliographia Benthamania, 32 
ARCHIVARIA 114, 116 (1991) (noting that “[a]mong the early supporters of Basic English 
Ogden could count on were George Bernard Shaw, Julian Huxley, and H.G. Wells.”). 
13 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (C.K. Ogden trans., 1922).  
For more on this collaboration, see generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, LETTERS TO C.K. OG-
DEN WITH COMMENTS ON THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHI-
CUS (Georg Henrik von Wright ed., 1973); Mathieu Marion, Wittgenstein, Ramsey, and 
British Pragmatism, 4 EUR. J. PRAGMATISM & AM. PHIL. 1, 2 (2012).  
14 C.K. OGDEN, BENTHAM’S THEORY OF FICTIONS (1932); see also Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, 
Bentham’s Theory of Fictions—A ‘Curious Double Language,’ 11 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 
223 (1999).  
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is debatable.  What is not debatable is that the ideas about the depend-
ency of human thought on fictions expressed in this book are quite at 
odds with Bentham’s well-known views about the nefarious role played 
by fictions in law.  Whereas Bentham was famously derisive about legal 
fictions, calling them “a syphilis, which runs in every vein” of English law15 
along with many other colorful epithets, the words of Bentham that Og-
den gathered, which focus on the use of fictions outside the context of 
law, express an approving view of fictions as an “indispensable”16 consti-
tutive feature of human thought, which blurs the line between fiction and 
fact.  As Ogden summarized it, “Bentham believed that language must 
contain fictions in order to remain a language” and in order to express 
thought.17  Far from regarding them as “vile lies”18 (the term he used when 
describing legal fictions), Bentham described the fictions he thought to 
be ubiquitous in scientific thought and everyday factual observations, as 
“a sort of innocent falsehood, the utterance of which is necessary to the 
purpose of discourse.”19  In short, at least as presented by Ogden, Ben-
tham espoused a theory of fictionalism similar in content and spirit to 
Vaihinger’s. 
  Despite Ogden’s effort to popularize it, Bentham’s Theory of Fic-
tions had little impact, although it was reviewed in the pages of the Har-
vard Law Review by Lon Fuller, the renowned American legal philoso-
pher, in 1933, shortly after it was published.  Fuller was dismissive of the 
book, pronouncing “Bentham’s turn of mind . . . inimical to the painstaking 
analysis demanded by these subjects.”20  Fuller had expressed his own 
 
15 JEREMY BENTHAM, 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 92 (John Bowring ed., London, 
Simpkin & Marshall 1843). 
16 OGDEN, supra note 14, at xxxii, 15. 
17 Id. at i. 
18 Id. at 141-45. 
19 Id.  at xliii. 
20 L.L. Fuller, Review: Bentham’s Theory of Fictions, 47 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1933).  
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thoughts on “these subjects” in a series of law review articles the preced-
ing year.21  Originally published in the Illinois Law Review between 1930 
and 1931, Fuller’s essays remain the leading work on the subject of legal 
fictions, thanks largely to their republication in the form of a book in the 
late 1960s, when Fuller was at the height of his fame.22  They were writ-
ten when Fuller was still a young man and starting out in his career as a 
legal philosopher.  The first essay, which became the first chapter of the 
book, addresses the definitional question of what legal fictions are.  The 
second addresses the question of what legal fictions are for.  And the 
final one is entirely devoted to a discussion of Vaihinger.23 
 Fuller’s work reflects the wide influence that Vaihinger’s Philoso-
phy of ‘As If’ once enjoyed.  By the time his essays were reissued as a 
book in 1967 under the elegantly simple title Legal Fictions, Vaihinger 
had long been out of fashion and Fuller was obliged to update his thirty-
five year old work with a reference to the then-reigning philosopher of 
science, Thomas Kuhn.24  But  when he first wrote those essays, in the 
early 1930s, Fuller was far from alone in his fascination with Vaihinger’s 
philosophy.  Indeed, as Kwame Anthony Appiah recently recalled in an 
interview he gave just last Spring, Vaihinger was, for a while, “incredibly 
famous.”25  Although his ideas never entered into popular consciousness, 
as Freud’s did, his influence during the teens, twenties, and thirties ex-
tended well beyond the fields of philosophy of science and mind (where 
his readers included the likes of Wittgenstein and Carnap)26 to include 
 
21 L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363 (1930); L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. 
L. REV. 513 (1931); L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 877 (1931). 
22 LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967). 
23 Interestingly, Fuller relied on his own translation of Vaihinger, rather than C.K. Ogden’s. 
24 FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS, supra note 22.  
25 See Andy Fitch, Pictures for Many Different Purposes: Talking to Anthony Appiah, 
BLOG: LOS ANGELES REVIEW OF BOOKS (May 11, 2018), https://blog.lareviewofbooks.org/in-
terviews/pictures-many-different-purposes-talking-anthony-appiah.  
26 A.W. CARUS, CARNAP AND TWENTIETH CENTURY THOUGHT: EXPLICATION AS ENLIGHTENMENT 
126 (2007) (“Vaihinger’s positive doctrines influenced Carnap less than the basic frame-
work in which he articulated the Kantian questions.”). 
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scholars of linguistics, religion, and law.  His philosophy of as if also was 
a significant influence on the budding Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, 
most notably, on Alfred Adler27 and Sigmund Freud.28 
 Anne Dailey’s new book, Law and the Unconscious: A Psychoan-
alytic Perspective,29 marks the revival of both law and psychoanalysis 
and the fictionalist philosophy of ‘as if.’  And it stands as an important 
reminder of their interrelationship.  Although Dailey does not reference 
Vaihinger, the commitment of psychoanalysis to a philosophy of ‘as if’—
and the indispensability of this philosophy to law—are central themes of 
her book. 
Dailey takes “intent” and “motive” as her primary examples of 
facts that the law is routinely required to “find,” which can only be con-
cluded to exist by relying on certain fictions.  The elusiveness of subjec-
tive states of mind, which remain forever hidden inside the “black box” of 
the human mind, makes them a prime example of the problem of proof, 
and this “question of what we can know and prove about subjective states 
of mind” is presented by Dailey as one of the “two overarching inquiries” 
of her book.30  The other overarching inquiry is “the question of who we 
are as human beings,”31 more specifically, “what it means to be an agent 
with the capacity to choose freely”32 and, more fundamentally, whether 
we have the capacity to choose on which the assignment of legal and 
moral responsibility depends.  To each of these issues, Dailey responds 
with the identification of a legal fiction upon which courts and other insti-
tutions and actors routinely and necessarily rely. 
The legal fiction that corresponds to the issue of attributing 
agency and responsibility to human actors that Dailey identifies is the 
 
27 PAUL STEPANSKY, IN FREUD’S SHADOW: ADLER IN CONTEXT 154 (1983). 
28 Richard E. Geha, Freud As Fictionalist: The Imaginary Worlds of Psychoanalysis, in 2 
FREUD: APPRAISALS AND REAPPRAISALS (Paul Stepansky ed., 1988). 
29 ANNE C. DAILEY, LAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE (2017). 
30 Id. at 17.   
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 10. 
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fiction of rationality.  According to this fiction, adult individuals are pre-
sumed to be “conscious, knowing beings who generally make decisions 
consistent with their beliefs, desires, and intentions.”33  Dailey explains 
that this presumption has the status of a fiction because “no one actually 
believes that individuals are rational automatons” and “we know that peo-
ple behave irrationally at times.”34  Adhering to the presumption, Dailey 
explains, means that “the law acts as if people are rational.”35 The law 
applies the presumption knowing that people often behave irrationally 
and not knowing if that was the case in the particular situation to which 
the presumption is being applied.  The law does this, Dailey further ex-
plains, because “doing so seems essential to furthering the goals of a 
liberal legal system committed to the ideal of individual liberty.”36  It “relies 
on this well-entrenched fiction that people make conscious choices and 
consciously intend their actions in order to justify holding them responsi-
ble for their behavior.”37  
Much of Dailey’s book is concerned with effectuating a reconcili-
ation between law and psychoanalysis, which have become estranged 
from one another because of a mutual misunderstanding about their re-
spective views about the use of such fictions.  At first blush, the fact that 
“[l]aw resorts to a fiction of rationality”38 appears to put it at odds with 
psychoanalysis.  “The law thus resists psychoanalysis because the idea 
of the dynamic unconscious seems to be irredeemably at odds with the 
law’s liberal norms and the social order that law functions to uphold.”39  
Dailey is at pains to correct this “mistaken idea that psychoanalysis views 
the individual as helplessly irrational.”40  “Nothing could be further from 
the truth,” she says emphatically.41  The rest of the book, in particular, 
 
33 Id. at 18. 
34 Id.  
35 Id. (emphasis added).  
36 Id. at 21. 
37 Id. at 18. 
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chapters Three and Four, on the topics of “Psychoanalysis and Free Will” 
and “Guilty Minds” respectively, lays out her case for viewing psychoa-
nalysis as a discipline that, like law, aims at developing the faculty of 
reason and the mechanisms of ego control that make human beings into 
autonomous responsible individuals. Both law and psychoanalysis, in her 
view, are committed to a “a practical conception of human freedom that 
recognizes both agency and constraints on agency.”42  They thus ad-
dress the problem of holding people responsible for their actions in a 
similar way.   
There is a more fundamental problem, however, which Dailey 
recognizes also constitutes a site of convergence between law and psy-
choanalysis, and that is the question of “how does law know and prove 
what goes in the mind of legal actors?”43  This may sound like the same 
as the first issue, and the two are indeed intimately tied together, both 
practically and theoretically.  But the first is a question about whether the 
human psyche can ever satisfy the conditions for holding an individual 
responsible for her actions, given internal forces (e.g., emotions and an-
imal drives) and external forces (e.g., traumatic experiences or deficits in 
our upbringing that impair cognitive and emotional development) that 
drive our decisions.  Because these are forces over which we have no 
control, they call into question the assumption that human beings have 
the capacity for choice upon which assignments of blame and responsi-
bility rest.  This is separate from, and theoretically prior to, the question 
of how we can establish what was going in the mind of a particular human 
being in a particular situation.  That question only becomes relevant if we 
assume that people can satisfy the conditions for holding human beings 
responsible for their actions in most cases, as the presumption, or fiction, 
of rationality holds.  If we did not maintain that fiction, if we held that hu-
man beings are never capable of exercising agency, there would be no 
point in having mens rea requirements.  And if we thought there were 
some circumstances in which people have the capacity for rational 
 
42 Id. at 24. 
43 Id. at 29. 
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choice, but that the conditions in which this is true are rare, there still 
would be no warrant for presuming their capacity for choice and agency; 
the presumption would have to be the other way around.  It is only be-
cause we do make the presumption of rationality, which is based on the 
view that most human beings are usually able to engage in enough self-
reflection and self-control to warrant holding them responsible for their 
actions, that the question arises of how to determine if a person lacked 
the capacity for rational choice in a particular case, thereby rendering 
their punishment (or a judgment of civil liability) unjust or in need of miti-
gation. 
Dailey’s analysis of how law and psychoanalysis, respectively, 
deal with this problem of proof is one of the most interesting and im-
portant contributions of her book.  Furthering her project of bringing these 
two estranged fields back together, she convincingly shows that law and 
psychoanalysis share a theory and a practice of “as if.”  And in so doing, 
she reveals that the application of the legal fiction of rationality (which is 
to say, treating people as if  “individual decision-making is . . . the product 
of conscious, informed choice,” rather than “the result of unseen motiva-
tions, beliefs, and desires that often elude us”) rests on a more funda-
mental legal fiction: namely, that the law, in its “fact-finding” function, can 
establish “truth.” 44  Just as Dailey disputes the proposition that psychoa-
nalysis rejects the ideal of rationality on the basis of which judgments of 
culpability can be made, she disputes the proposition that law embraces 
a naive idea of establishing historical truth.  Instead, she shows that legal 
standards of proof, rules of evidence, and fact-finding procedures reflect 
a sophisticated understanding of the impossibility of ever establishing 
“historical truth” to a certainty.  From this understanding stems the belief 
that we need to accept “narrative truths,” stories about what likely hap-
pened in a particular case which are constructed out of beliefs about what 
usually happens.  (Here we see the link between narrative and probable, 
as opposed to certain, truths.)45  This same substitution of narrative for 
 
44 Id. at 21. 
45 Id. at 34-35.   
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historical truth is already recognized to be a feature of psychoanalysis, 
which “does not put the discovery of historical truth at the center of the 
inquiry,” but, rather, “focuses on constructing a narrative that makes 
sense of psychic truth.”46  Pointing to the work of post-Freudian psycho-
analysts, in particular D.W. Winnicott and other members of the British 
school of object-relations, Dailey shows how Freud’s flickering insight 
into the constructed nature of historical truth47 has been developed into 
a more consistent theory of narrative truth, which “derive[s] from the plau-
sibility and well-formedness of the narrative discourse.”48  Were it the 
case that the legal process of establishing facts purported to be “getting 
at ‘truth’ in any strictly empirical sense,” it would indeed be at odds with 
the psychoanalytic understanding of the kinds of truth claims we can 
make.  But, as Dailey shows, the law understands full well that its ability 
to uncover historical truth is a pretense and that all it can hope to do is to 
establish possible, at best probable truths. 
Hope itself, and its close cousin, wishfulness, is another of the 
principal subjects of Dailey’s book.  This is a fundamentally optimistic 
book that construes both law and psychoanalysis as optimistic disciplines 
motivated by the belief in the possibility that human beings can behave 
somewhat rationally and somewhat responsibly and that legal actors can 
themselves behave somewhat rationally and therefore justly.  But this is 
an optimism chastened by the awareness of the ever-present possibility 
of our irrational drives and desires overwhelming our better judgment and 
undermining just and responsible action, both on the part of the people 
who are subject to the law (i.e., all of us) and on the part of the people 
(judges and jurors) who are responsible for applying it.  Blindness, born 
of the wish for things to be otherwise than they are, as well as our simple 
inability to see things as they are actually are or as other people see 
them, is a perpetual danger.  (Some of the most compelling pages of the 
 
46 Id. at 34. 
47 Id. at 35. 
48 Id. (quoting PETER BROOKS, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND STORYTELLING 59 (1994)). 
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book discuss the doctrine of “willful blindness,” which holds people re-
sponsible for willfully avoiding knowledge that would have rendered them 
culpable of a crime.)  But while Dailey is alive to such dangers and to the 
law’s own willful blindness (to the forces that determine human action 
and to the limits of its own ability to know things), she is ultimately a be-
liever in the capacity for law and for people generally to be good.  Such 
optimism is tied to a fundamentally anti-perfectionist outlook, which es-
chews both perfectionism (the elimination of any doubt, not just reason-
able doubt) and radical skepticism (the refusal ever to judge or act on 
judgments because of the ineliminability of doubt).  Drawing on Win-
nicott’s well-known concept of the “good enough mother,” Dailey pro-
poses that “psychoanalysis points toward a vision of good-enough judg-
ing,” judging which is admittedly imperfect, falling far short of absolute 
certainty and truth, but nonetheless adequate to the tasks of meting out 
justice and satisfying other human needs.49 
The invocation of Winnicott’s good-enough mother points to the 
nurturing and caretaking nature of the law in its fact-finding mode.  By 
providing answers to questions of fact, the law satisfies our emotional 
need for closure.  It stills the anxiety that arises out of the uncertain state 
of not knowing things we have a strong desire to know.  It thereby not 
only soothes us on an emotional level.  It operates on a cognitive level 
as well, populating our brains with beliefs—beliefs about what usually 
happens, beliefs about what is supposed to happen, and beliefs about 
what happened in a particular case—that may or not be true.  Of course, 
this fact-finding function is not always successful.  The ability of the law 
to provide closure and the ability of people to gain closure from the law 
and to believe in the law both depend on suppressing the “as if” character 
of our beliefs.  When the awareness of that character surfaces, the law 
 
49 Id. at 79-85.  I also have proposed that the legal process of fact-finding is based on a 
model of good-enough judging analogous to Winnicott’s conception of the good-enough 
mother.  See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Anti-Anxiety Law: Winnicott and the Legal Fiction 
of Paternity, 64 AM. IMAGO 339, 343-45, 377 (2007). 
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is no longer able to serve the essentially maternal function of “minding” 
us.50   
“Minding,” it is worth noting, is a term used in England to refer to 
the work of childcare and, more generally, caretaking.  (A “childminder” 
is a nanny).  In philosophical discourse, the term refers to the processes 
by which the diffuse psychological processes of the human brain become 
integrated into the form or substance of a “mind” and populated with par-
ticular perceptions, beliefs, and ideas.51  Dailey’s turn to the object-rela-
tions school of psychoanalysis, with its focus on early childhood devel-
opment and the mother-infant relationship, sheds light on how the law 
performs both these aspects of “minding,” just as mothers traditionally 
have performed the role of minding children, at one and the same time.  
In doing so, it offers a model of legal authority that contrasts with the 
paternal model of authority associated with the law’s regulatory and pe-
nal functions, the more common focus of works on law and psychoanal-
ysis.  Calling attention to the fact-finding function of the law, Dailey asks 
us to consider what happens to our understanding of law when, rather 
than drawing exclusively upon Freud’s account of law “as prohibitions,” 
which “the child” (i.e., the son) “learns to obey . . . out of fear that the 
father will unleash his castrating fury,” we instead, or also, model the law 
on the relationship of the child to the mother.52  By locating the origin of 
the law in the pre-Oedipal time of maternal caregiving, she reveals the 
extent to which legal authority is constituted by bonds of attachment 
(love) as much as fear.  And she further reveals the extent to which such 
emotional bonds are integrally related to the formation of cognitive be-
liefs.  The two functions that legal fictions perform, the creation of a state 
of cognitive certainty, which entails the formation of certain beliefs, and 
the creation of state of emotional calm, which follows the resolution of 
 
50 See id. 
51 See, e.g., JONATHAN LEAR, OPEN MINDED: WORKING OUT THE LOGIC OF THE SOUL 249 
(1998) (explaining that “A person is minded in a certain way if he has the perceptions of 
salience, routes of interest, feelings of naturalness in following a rule, and so on which 
constitute a form of life.”) 
52 Dailey, supra note 29, at 235. 
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uncertainty, are not just analogous to the functions traditionally ascribed 
to the mother.  They are the functions ascribed by Winnicott to the “good-
enough mother,” whom he understood to play an indispensable role in 
facilitating cognitive development and the formation of a basic sense of 
reality.  As Winnicott depicts it, this cognitive function of the maternal 
caregiver is not a separate function that exists alongside the provision of 
emotional and physical caretaking.  It is through the acts of physical care-
giving (feeding and holding) and emotional caretaking (loving and looking 
with the maternal gaze) that the mind begins to integrate itself and to 
integrate a self, which is to say, the perception of the difference between 
self and other, which begins as the perception of the difference between 
self and mother. 
Winnicott was crystal-clear about the dependency of cognitive de-
velopment on the physical acts of being held and fed and loved (claims 
that have since been confirmed by neurological science.)53  And he was 
equally explicit about the “illusionary” nature of the perception of reality 
that is the result of normal psychological development.54  Most babies, 
Winnicott maintained, “are fortunate enough to have a mother whose in-
itial active adaptation to their infant’s needs was good enough.”55  He 
goes on to say that “[t]his enables them to have the illusion of actually 
finding what was created (hallucinated).”56  “Eventually,” he concludes, 
“such a baby grows up to say, ‘I know there is no direct contact between 
external reality and myself, only an illusion of contact, a midway phenom-
enon that works very well for me when I am not tired.  I couldn’t care less 
that there is a philosophical problem.’”57  The philosophical problem that 
 
53 See, e.g., Mörelius et al., Early Maternal Contact has an Impact on Preterm Infants’ 
Brain Systems that Manage Stress, 28 NURS. CHILD. & YOUNG PEOPLE 18, 62-63 (2016); 
Feldman, Rosenthal & Eidelman, Maternal-Preterm Skin-to-Skin Contact Enhances Child 
Physiologic Organization and Cognitive Control Across the First 10 Years of Life, 75 BIOL. 
PSYCHIATRY 55-64 (2014).  
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Winnicott here alludes to is of course the same as that which occupied 
Vaihinger, Bentham, and Fuller, the problem of how we know things 
given the fact that the human mind is unable to make “direct contact” with 
reality.  For Winnicott, as for Vaihinger and other thinkers who accept 
that the human mind cannot simply reflect external reality, the problem 
extends beyond the difficulty of proving subjective states of minds.  It is 
not just “[w]hat ‘lurks within’ [that] can never be known directly.”58  As 
Winnicott and Vaihinger recognized, all facts present the same problem: 
they can’t be simply found.  They have to be constructed.  They have to 
be fabricated.  That is to say, they have to be fictions.  (The root of mean-
ing of fiction, it needs to be recalled, is simply that which is fabricated or 
formed.) 
Dailey’s turn to Winnicott and the other object-relations theorists 
to explain how facts are found in and by law helps us to see that the 
creation of beliefs about facts out of inferences and indicia is one of the 
essential functions of the adjudicative system.  It helps us to see, further, 
that this is an essentially maternal function, which replicates the emo-
tional and cognitive effects of the good enough mother.  Like the good 
enough mother, the good enough judge performs the two kinds of mind-
ing at once, soothing us on the emotional level and populating our minds 
with beliefs on the cognitive level—soothing us by populating our minds 
with beliefs.  Thus, the good enough judge stills anxiety by creating an 
illusion of certainty and constructing a matrix of beliefs that we treat as if 
they were true (“a midway” phenomenon that usually “works very well”).59   
The corollary to this is that when beliefs fail to “work very well,” 
they cease to function as such, that is to say, they fail to be accepted. 
Winnicott proposes that beliefs fail to “work” when we are “tired,” by which 
he seems to mean, temporarily disabled from making the mental effort 
required to sustain suspension of disbelief that usually keeps us going.60  
These are the moments in which our ability to keep up the usual illusions 
 
58 Dailey, supra note 29, at 29. 
59 HUMAN NATURE, supra note 56, at 115.  
60 Id. 
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flags and we suddenly see flashes of the reality that lies beyond our per-
ceptions.  In these moments, we question our perceptions or our very 
ability to perceive things as they are. 
But fatigue is hardly the only situation which brings about such 
lapses of “illusionment,” as Winnicott refers to the normal state of human 
consciousness.  There are other, political and cultural, circumstances in 
which the official fictions cease to work.  When the authorized presump-
tions fail to meet our practical needs, our awareness of their fictional na-
ture comes to the surface, overwhelming our ability to suspend disbelief 
and treat them as if they are true.  Dailey’s turn to the object-relations 
school does not tell us much about what these circumstances are, but by 
helping us to see that it is utility that is the critical determinant, her anal-
ysis points toward a needs-based account for evaluating the validity of 
legal fictions and understanding when and why they fail to work.  It is 
meeting, or failing to meet, human needs that fictionalism tells us is the 
relevant criterion, not some Archimedean standard of objective truth. 
Dailey’s turn to Winnicott and other object-relations also helps us 
to see that the way the law constructs facts is a practical implementation 
of the philosophy of “as if.”  This philosophy existed in law long before 
Vaihinger.  Vaihinger did not himself apply his theory to law.  It was Fuller 
who applied Vaihinger’s theory to fictions in law.61  But in doing so he 
was merely revealing an understanding of the fictive nature of fact-finding 
that has always been an integral part of the theory and practice of law.  
For Dailey, the most immediate source for the fictionalist view is not 
Vaihinger, but Oliver Wendell Holmes.  Her book builds on her earlier 
work on Holmes, which located him at the intersection of nineteenth cen-
tury romanticism and philosophical pragmatism.62  Reaching back to 
Holmes as her philosophical forbear, she shows how the justification for 
substituting merely probable truths that we treat “as if” they are true for 
 
61 For a recent discussion of Vaihinger’s omission of legal discourse from his analysis of 
the use of fictions in scientific and religious discourse, and Fuller’s role in bringing 
Vaihinger’s theory of fictions to bear on law, see SIMON STERN, LEGAL FICTIONS AND THE 
LEGAL IMAGINATION (forthcoming) (on file with the author). 
62 Anne C. Dailey, Holmes and the Romantic Mind, 48 DUKE L.J. 429 (1998). 
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certain truth is an expression of philosophical pragmatism, but also, at 
the same time, of romanticism.  Romanticism goes beyond merely rec-
ognizing the limits of human reason (as pragmatism does) to exalt the 
wild and irrational dimensions the human mind.  But what links the two is 
a kind of wishful thinking: if only we could act as if people are rational, 
the Holmesian view that Dailey adopts seems to say, the wish for ration-
ality would become self-fulfilling—at least to a point. 
Dailey’s invocation of Holmes demonstrates the fundamental link 
between fictionalism and pragmatism.  The idea that fictions, such as the 
fiction of rationality, are validated by their utility is an expression of the 
basic pragmatic idea that there is no criterion for validating beliefs other 
than utility.  More specifically, fictionalism asserts that fictions are valid if 
acting as if they are true serves to get people to act in ways that meet 
our basic needs.  The needs whose satisfaction fictionalism posits as the 
sole criterion for validating beliefs are psychological as well as material, 
including the need for comfort and stability, the need for knowledge and 
a sense that the world is basically just.  These ideas are the common 
coin of all theories of mind and theories of knowledge that fall under the 
broad umbrella of philosophical pragmatism. 
To be sure, Vaihinger rejected the application of this label to his 
philosophy.63  He insisted that his philosophy of “as if” was distinguisha-
ble from the philosophical pragmatism in vogue when he was writing (a 
vogue owing in no small measure to the influence of Holmes and 
Holmes’s intellectual comrades, William James, John Dewey, and 
Charles Sanders Peirce.)  But in this insistence there was a strong hint 
of protesting too much.  Vaihinger wrote the dissertation from which his 
famous book derived in the very decade that American philosophical 
 
63 See, e.g., Fine, supra note 7, at 8 (“In highlighting the idealizations and approximations 
commonly used in modeling physical phenomena, Vaihinger’s central concern is to undo 
the opinion that if constructs are devoid of reality they are also devoid of utility. Put the 
other way around, Vaihinger regards the inference from utility to reality as fundamentally 
incorrect. Thus, despite his pragmatic emphasis on thought as a tool for action, he wants 
to distinguish his position from the Jamesian form of pragmatism that regards truth to be 
whatever turns out to be “good” by way of belief, for all the scientific fictions satisfy this 
formula.”).  
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pragmatism first emerged, when the movement was at the peak of its 
influence (the 1870s).  The intellectual leader of that movement, Charles 
Peirce, also went to great lengths to distinguish his philosophy from prag-
matism, going so far as to coin an ungainly neologism—“pragmaticism”—
in order to deny the connection between his philosophy and pragmatism.  
Needless to say, the term never caught on, and today, Peirce is widely 
recognized as the father of American pragmatism, notwithstanding his 
efforts to deny it.  By the same token, without getting caught up in the 
philosophical quibbles that separate one version of pragmatism from an-
other, we can recognize that Vaihinger’s philosophy likewise belongs to 
the tradition of philosophical pragmatism, notwithstanding his attempts to 
deny it. 
The basic pragmatist principle, shared by psychoanalytic thinkers 
like Winnicott, philosophers like Vaihinger and legal scholars like Fuller, 
is that the only test of any fact claim’s validity is its utility.  If it works, it 
can be treated as “true.”  Utility in turn is related to probability.  On the 
pragmatist view, probable truths are a serviceable substitute for certain 
truths.  Together, probability and utility constitute the only criteria of 
“truth” or validity we have.   
This is the view that underlies the assertion that facts are con-
structions.  In today’s parlance we might use the term “social construc-
tions,” but an earlier age preferred the term fictions.  Fiction, from this 
point of view, is synonymous with construction.  A fiction is a thing that is 
fabricated, constructed, by human minds.  As Fuller argued at great 
length in his otherwise short book, fictions are not the same as false-
hoods; they might even be “true” in most cases, meaning the application 
of a legal fiction to a particular situation might correspond with what was 
actually the case.  Thus, for example, the legal fiction of paternity—the 
presumption that husbands are fathers of their wives’ babies—might be 
applied in cases where the husband who is declared to be the father 
actually did impregnate his wife!  But the fact (so to speak) remains that 
even in those cases, the facts are not, strictly speaking, proven.  They 
are merely presumed to be true.  They, accordingly, become the basis 
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for acting as if they were true, with beneficial and dangerous conse-
quences as the case may be.  They are, in this sense, constructions or 
fictions. 
We are living in a moment of renewed interest in the role of fic-
tions in establishing legal and scientific facts.  In 2017, the same year 
that Anne Dailey’s book on law and psychoanalysis was published, the 
philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah published a work of philosophy 
called As If: Idealization and Ideals.64  As his title clearly signifies to those 
in the know (and a major aim of the book is clearly to have more people 
in the know), the book is a tribute to, and an attempt to revive interest in, 
Vaihinger’s philosophy of “as if.”  Resisting the persistent irrepressible 
tendency to regard fictions as dangerous lies, Appiah aims, as his book 
jacket proclaims, to explore “how strategic untruth plays a critical role in 
far-flung areas of inquiry,” including decision theory, psychology, natural 
science, and political philosophy.”65  Like Vaihinger before him, Appiah 
does not focus on law.  But the potential applications to law are not hard 
to miss.   
It would be nice to see Appiah and Dailey in dialogue together.  
That would allow for a fuller exploration of how Vaihinger’s philosophy of 
“as if” and fictionalism, more generally, apply to the law.  More im-
portantly, it would allow for the role of law in the creation of “as if” truths 
to be more fully explored.  Even outside the domains of judicial proceed-
ings, it is clear that there is something “lawlike” going on in the construc-
tion of scientific, religious, and everyday factual beliefs.  What that lawlike 
something is has yet to be fully explicated (though social theorists like 
Foucault and historians and philosophers of science like Daston, Shapin 
and Shaffer, to name just a few, have made important contributions to 
 
64 KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, AS IF: IDEALIZATION AND IDEALS (2017). 
65 Kwame Anthony Appiah: “Sometimes in Thinking about the World, the Truth Isn’t What 












our understanding).66  In its careful attention to the actual practices of 
fact-finding in legal cases, Dailey’s book opens a window into the ways 
in which substantive rules and standards (like the presumption of ration-
ality and doctrines of culpability) interact with evidentiary rules and prac-
tices (like legal presumptions that we treat as if they were true, thereby 
creating and indulging in the fiction that we have found the presumed 
facts to be true). 
It is worth pondering why the return to Vaihinger and the philoso-
phy of as if is occurring at this moment.  Perhaps in a time of “truthiness” 
(or are we already post-truthiness?), fake news, and blatant lying, we are 
in need of a way of recognizing lies and falsehoods and arriving at shared 
truths that doesn’t depend on denying the constructed nature of the sto-
ries we tell and the fictive nature of facts.  In a recent commentary on the 
confirmation hearing debacle which recently took place, at which then 
nominee, now Justice, Brett Kavanaugh was credibly accused of sexual 
assault and lying under oath, Randol Schoenberg, a lawyer best known 
for recovering the famous Klimt paintings in one of the first Nazi-looted 
art cases,67 wrote a blog about the Kavanaugh hearing that began with a 
translation of the German phrase for wishful thinking: “the wish is the 
father of the idea.”68  Schoenberg is the grandson of Arthur Schoenberg, 
the renowned classical composer, and of Eric Ziesl, also a classical com-
poser of note, both of whom were part of the community of “Hollywood 
exiles” who escaped from “Freud’s Vienna,” as  their shared milieu is 
 
66 See, e.g., LORRAINE DASTON, OBJECTIVITY (2007); LORRAINE DASTON, CLASSICAL PROBA-
BILITY IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1988); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH 
OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977); STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH 
(1994). 
67 The case of Republic of Austria v. Altmann and Schoenberg’s role in litigating it are 
depicted in the films Woman in Gold, Stealing Klimt and Adele’s Wish and in the book 
LADY IN GOLD: THE EXTRAORDINARY TALE OF GUSTAV KLIMT’S MASTERPIECE, PORTRAIT OF AD-
ELE BLOCH-BAUER (2012) by Anne-Marie O’Connor. 
68 E. Randol Schoenberg, Wishful Thinking and Reasonable Doubt, SHOENBLOG (Sept. 
20, 2018), http://schoenblog.com/?p=1592. 
47
DAILEY: Law and the Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,






often referred to, settling in Los Angeles.  Schoenberg fils (more pre-
cisely, fils of fils) grew up in this community, absorbing the culture and 
the history of his grandparents and their close-knit circle of friends and 
dedicating himself to perpetuating the memory of that culture.  His artfully 
constructed dissection of the evidence against Kavanaugh, assessing 
the credibility of Kavanaugh and his accuser, begins by confronting the 
undeniable psychoanalytic fact that, indeed, “the wish is the father of the 
idea.”69  He then goes on to carefully sift the evidence and analyze the 
testimonies given respectively by Kavanaugh and his accuser, Dr. Chris-
tine Blasey-Ford.  Schoenberg assesses each piece of evidence for its 
likelihood against the background of what experience or science has 
taught is usually true in these matters, thereby exemplifying the pragma-
tist method of relying probabilistic truths.  Thus, he rebuts the argument 
that “she waited too long to tell anyone” with the observation that “[i]t is 
quite common, perhaps even more common, for people to keep secret 
an incident of sexual assault,” and likewise responds to the argument “no 
one else can confirm her story” by observing that “this is something that 
is true with many sexual assault allegations.”70  Throughout his analysis, 
Schoenberg reminds us of the necessity of being vigilant about the pos-
sibility that our own assessments of the evidence are subject to our 
wishes—and the need to take active steps to emancipate ourselves from 
our wishful thinking.  “[W]hen you are deciding issues where you really 
do care about the result, it is not so easy to make sure that your wish is 
not controlling the way your mind is working.  You have to try to sublimate 




71 Id.  In the same paragraph, Schoenberg expresses his disappointment in Justice Ka-
vanaugh’s initial Senate testimony that recited the now obligatory mantra that “[a] good 
judge must be an umpire, a neutral and impartial arbiter who favors no litigant or policy.” 
Id.  Ironically speculating that “[p]erhaps he was the only student at  Yale Law School 
who didn’t receive the notoriously theoretical training that Yale was best known for at the 
time,” Schoenberg asserts that due to his legal training, Kavanaugh “certainly must know 
that judges do more than just ‘call balls and strikes’” and takes him to task for failing to 
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This is exactly the type of psychoanalytic technique that Dailey says 
should inform legal practice. 
Wishful thinking, Schoenberg’s topic, and willful blindness, Dai-
ley’s special concern, are two sides of the same coin.  Both represent 
forms of blindness and, indeed, bias, to which we are all inescapably 
prone.  Accepting that facts are social constructions, legal fictions, re-
quires squarely recognizing that we often fail to see the truth, that is, we 
often fail to see other people’s perspectives and legitimate needs be-
cause of how we are blinded by our own desires and needs.  But that 
does not mean we are incapable of enlarging our vision.  To the contrary, 
as Schoenberg’s skillful analysis demonstrates, recognizing our blind-
spots is the necessary prerequisite to overcoming them and arriving at 
good enough judgments of the truth. 
In our flailing attempts to come to grips with the attack on common 
standards and procedures for fact-finding and decision-making, there 
has been a tendency to blame our current predicament on intellectual 
schools of thought that call attention to the constructed nature of facts 
and deny the possibility of objective truth.  These attacks on postmod-
ernism are worse than risible.  They promote the kind of facile thinking 
and false dichotomies that the philosophy of as if—and the law—has al-
ways wisely eschewed.  The simultaneous appearance of Dailey’s and 
Appiah’s books heralds a revival of this ancient wisdom.  With her focus 
on the common philosophical heritage of psychoanalysis and law, Dai-
ley’s work in particular turns our attention to the essential task at hand:  
  
 
acknowledge that “deciding legal and factual issues all require creativity and ideas,” of 
which, “as the German saying goes,” the wish is the father. 
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not to deny the dependency of factfinding on fictions, but to develop the 
tools for distinguishing between valid and invalid fictions—tools that are 
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MARTHA MERRILL UMPHREY 
Law and Psychoanalysis: An Ambivalent Attachment 
 
Allow me to begin with a poem, resonant with Anne Dailey’s pro-
ject. 
 
WH Auden, Law Like Love (1939) 
Law, say the gardeners, is the sun, 
Law is the one 
All gardeners obey 
To-morrow, yesterday, to-day. 
 
Law is the wisdom of the old, 
The impotent grandfathers feebly scold;  
The grandchildren put out a treble tongue, 
Law is the senses of the young. 
 
Law, says the priest with a priestly look, 
Expounding to an unpriestly people, 
Law is the words in my priestly book, 
Law is my pulpit and my steeple. 
 
Law, says the judge as he looks down his nose, 
Speaking clearly and most severely, 
Law is as I've told you before, 
Law is as you know I suppose, 
Law is but let me explain it once more, 
Law is The Law. 
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Yet law-abiding scholars write: 
Law is neither wrong nor right, 
Law is only crimes 
Punished by places and by times, 
Law is the clothes men wear 
Anytime, anywhere, 
Law is Good morning and Good night. 
 
Others say, Law is our Fate;  
Others say, Law is our State;  
Others say, others say 
Law is no more, 
Law has gone away. 
 
And always the loud angry crowd, 
Very angry and very loud, 
Law is We, 
And always the soft idiot softly Me. 
 
If we, dear, know we know no more 
Than they about the Law, 
If I no more than you 
Know what we should and should not do 
Except that all agree 
Gladly or miserably 
That the Law is 
And that all know this 
If therefore thinking it absurd 
To identify Law with some other word, 
Unlike so many men 
I cannot say Law is again, 
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No more than they can we suppress 
The universal wish to guess 
Or slip out of our own position 
Into an unconcerned condition. 
Although I can at least confine 
Your vanity and mine 
To stating timidly 
A timid similarity, 
We shall boast anyway: 
Like love I say. 
 
Like love we don't know where or why, 
Like love we can't compel or fly, 
Like love we often weep, 
Like love we seldom keep.1 
 
I begin with this poem in order to praise Anne Dailey’s book for its deep 
investment in a humanities-embracing approach to law and legal theory. 
Like Auden, Anne leans into the largest questions one can ask about the 
nature of law; and like Auden, far from abandoning law, Anne reframes 
or recasts those questions from a perspective that emphasizes the con-
stitutive place of humanness in any conversation about the relation be-
tween law and justice. As she suggests, “Law and psychoanalysis share 
a humanistic perspective regarding the idiosyncratic, individual, and di-
verse nature of subjective experience.”2 
That perspective emerges halfway through Auden’s poem, when 
the narrator turns from the project of mapping various authoritative or 
monologic opinions on the nature of law (from gardeners, priests, judges, 
mobs, idiots) to a dialogic conjuring of law via a colloquy with an intimate 
addressee. Shifting tone, the narrator speaks of a “we,” uncertain but 
impelled by a desire to understand law (“the universal wish to guess”) 
 
1 W.H. AUDEN, Law like Love, in THE COLLECTED POETRY OF W.H. AUDEN 74 (1945).  
2 ANNE DAILEY, LAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS:  A PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE 10 (2017). 
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and by unavoidable implication in it (our own position is not an uncon-
cerned condition), that approaches law from a slant perspective.  Moving 
from metaphor (law is) to simile (law is like), the final stanza constitutes 
the “we” as profoundly human, subject to forces that cannot be con-
trolled, affectively saturated, and fundamentally irrational; in short, the 
legal subject Anne places before us. 
Anne’s approach is quite unlike other law and humanities schol-
ars interested in the conjunction of law and psychoanalysis because she 
conceives of psychoanalysis not just as a set of theories about human 
mind and subjectivity, but also as a set of clinical practices and relations; 
in other words, as a pragmatic response to human suffering. Among the 
many aspects of this book to admire, I appreciate the clarity with which it 
renders contemporary psychoanalytic precepts, the pragmatism of 
Anne’s applications of psychoanalysis to law, and the impressive reach 
of the legal implications of her analysis. Orienting the book to the actual 
practice of psychoanalysis helps Anne overcome well-trodden scholarly 
claims that law and psychoanalysis have incompatible aims.3  
 Anne offers an incisive critique of liberal legality’s fantasy of a le-
gal subject—reasoning, autonomous, transparent—and thereby a cri-
tique of the injustices done under liberal legality’s name. As is true in 
psychoanalytic practice, she argues, law ought to imagine the self and 
psyche as dynamic, relational, and only relatively autonomous, and it 
ought to both foster and, on a larger scale, engage in the kind of self-
reflection that brings it closer to doing justice to individuals.   
Although Anne’s project is in one sense to analyze, inflect and 
reframe legal theory and doctrine by drawing our attention to psychoan-
alytic approaches to problems in various areas of law, her work is in-
vested in finding and illuminating some parallels between psychoanalysis 
and law that in fact go to the very heart of an inquiry into the nature of 
 
3 Indeed, as Anne notes, Freud himself famously made such an argument: he resisted 
psychoanalysis’s use as a legal tool to assess guilt. But that is a very narrow way to 
conceive the relation between law and psychoanalysis, as Anne shows us. And perhaps 
Freud had a deficient understanding of the juridical anyway. 
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law itself. Law and the Unconscious broadly considers the implications 
of certain fundaments of psychoanalysis in three different domains: legal 
theory, specific legal doctrines, and processes of adjudication. Focusing 
here only on the third domain, and more specifically the trial, Anne’s in-
sights enable us to see and ask questions about a number of shared 
epistemological and structural parallels between psychoanalytic and ad-
judicative modes of inquiry and judgment.   
First, Anne’s emphasis on the dynamic relation between analyst 
and patient, captured by the concepts of transference and countertrans-
ference (particularly in her chapters on confessions and on sexual 
choice), suggests that we might fruitfully analyze the courtroom as a site 
of complex, dynamic relationality. Judges, she argues, are like analysts 
insofar as they operate under a professional imperative to reflect on their 
inevitable assumptions and biases as they make adjudicative decisions.4 
Indeed one could ask further questions about how judges engage rela-
tionally with those who come before them: the aesthetics of the robe and 
bench; the laying out of rules and rulings; the censorious condemnation 
of threats to courtroom order. How, one might ask, is the courtroom like 
the human mind? What must be repressed for it to conduct its operations 
in a civilized manner? What relations of authority, dependence, and de-
sire emerge among judge, jury, attorneys, and litigants or defendants?  
Second, psychoanalytic practice is, fundamentally, about story-
telling—about both what is said and how it is heard, or more precisely 
what can be said and how both words and silences are interpreted. Trials 
do something similar: they generate highly stylized narratives of guilt, in-
nocence, mitigation, and excuse crafted with concerted attention to lan-
guage, to rules that govern what can and cannot be said, and to audi-
ence. Attorneys tell stories in ways that attempt to impose interpretive 
codes on juries (pay attention to this; disregard that; x action can be in-
terpreted as meaning y legally), even as the trial process constantly 
threatens to undo their stories with testimonial disruptions and adversar-
ial counternarratives. Judges and juries must interpret such stories with 
 
4 DAILEY, supra note 2, at 138. 
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the goal of assessing their truth-value and generating a coherent-enough 
explanation of past events on which to ground judgment.  
Third, on a deeper level psychoanalysis reveals that one can 
never gain full access to knowledge about the self and about one’s past. 
Some part of that past is inaccessible to the conscious mind. At the same 
time, psychoanalysis suggests that the not-fully-retrievable past, even if 
it is repressed, is always in dynamic relation to the present. The same 
problematic is evident in trials, which narrate past events reconstructively 
without being able fully to re-present them. Fallible memories, exclusions 
of evidence, stories emphasizing some facts over others—so many 
traces of the past are distorted or lost in adjudication. As Anne suggests, 
“Although the law’s adjudicatory mission is to uncover historical truth, it 
is clear that we are not always getting at ‘truth’ in a strictly empirical sense 
… Psychoanalysis and law each combine modes of historical analysis 
with modes of narrative construction.”5 As such, trials cannot fully recon-
struct historical truth, any more than a patient in analysis can: at best, 
both settings offer stylized reenactments and interpretations. If psychoa-
nalysis offers “psychic truth,” trials offer “legal truth,” which is not coex-
tensive with historical truth (assuming we can ever get at that). In other 
words, the truths trials attempt to capture emerge from present perfor-
mance of a not-fully-retrievable past: a social dreamscape that must be 
interpreted in order to generate the grounds for judgment. 
Anne’s insistence on the relevance of psychoanalytic thinking and 
practice to law signals the fruitfulness of a humanities-oriented approach 
to the analysis of legal theory, institutions, and particular doctrines: Law 
and the Unconscious provokes rich, complex, and deeply relevant ques-
tions about what law is and should be. Ultimately, for me, the book en-
joins us to view law through a psychoanalytic lens in ways that suggest 
law to be a site not just of rules enforced by legitimated violence, but also 
of attachment, with all the heartache that can bring. Anne emphasizes 
ambivalent attachment:6 just as does a child with a parent, we both desire 
 
5 Id. at 36. 
6 Id. at 91. 
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and reject law; we internalize it, parry it, fall in love with it, are dependent 
on it, break it even as it can break us. As Auden concludes: Like love we 
often weep/Like love we seldom keep. 
This is to my mind Anne’s most fundamental insight into the na-
ture of law: we desire the order it generates even as we resist or reject 
its judgments and its violence. Indeed it is precisely out of our ambivalent 
attachment to law—our love and hate of it—that calls for justice emerge, 
in both senses of the term: calls for violence as punishment for wrongdo-
ing—for unleashing the aggression of the state—but also calls for equity 
and the amelioration of violence against those dependent on law, for the 
exercise of care and mercy in judging individuals. Anne’s book is a com-
pelling exploration of these ambivalent dynamics, and itself an example 
of them. For what else is a call for legal reform, such as this wonderful 
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In the Heart of Criminal Law’s Darkness 
 
Anne Dailey’s Law & the Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Per-
spective is exactly what we would expect from Anne: it is graceful, per-
ceptive, humanist in the broadest sense of the word, and asks a big ques-
tion—how might a surfacing of the unconscious challenge the 
presumption of rationality as core to a liberal legal framework. Anne chal-
lenges what she calls “law’s dogged resistance to the reality of uncon-
scious life.” 
In this sense, the entire book is a psychoanalytic enterprising, 
burrowing beneath the surface of a conscious legalism. Law & the Un-
conscious pursues Freud’s preoccupation with the surfacing of what has 
been buried.  It is a manifesto calling for the revivification of a project that 
emerged in law school in the 1960s, and resulted in the publication by 
Jay Katz, Joseph Goldstein, and Alan Dershowitz of a treatise on law and 
psychoanalysis. It demands a meaningful encounter with a methodology 
that was familiar some fifty years ago, but which is now often seen as 
archaic, threatening, or too cumbersome to deploy—a method from 
which we have become estranged.  Anne’s book traces the genealogy of 
law’s borrowing from psychoanalysis from Freud to Frank, from Clarence 
Darrow’s defense of Leopold and Loeb to Judge David Bazelon. It is an 
Audubon field guide to the many species of legal doctrine that must grap-
ple with the cognitive ecosystem of the unconscious: the teasing out of 
confessions, contracts with hidden motives, children’s rights, and the co-
nundrum of legally propped-up incest taboos in an age of sexual free-
dom. But, above everything else the book is a geological trench that re-
minds us of the subterranean dark places where desire, repression, and 
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the unspoken lurk. It is, as they like to say in the humanities, an interro-
gation with an interrogative. A complication.   
Anne begins her introduction with the modest opening words of 
the path-breaking treatise Psychoanalysis, Psychiatry, & the Law pub-
lished in 1967 by Katz, Goldstein, and Dershowitz: “The materials are 
designed to present a detailed study of psychoanalytic theory and to ex-
plore its relevance, if any, to law.”1 This, of course (as Anne herself points 
out) is itself a deliciously psychoanalytic moment. It is a deflection, a de-
fense mechanism—what does any mean? Anne’s book is an attempt to 
address this lacuna. But perhaps Anne is making another gesture as 
well: she is simply deploying this phrase, if any, to suggest that we still 
(so many years later) need to make a special plea for relevance. 
The book is chock-full of examples where a cognitive bias to-
wards conscious, reasoned choice renders the unconscious opaque. I 
want to provide just one more example—which, unfortunately, entails the 
brutal murder of a child. The case is People v. Anderson,2 a California 
Supreme Court case decided en banc just a year after the above-men-
tioned treatise was published. It involved a border, Robert Anderson, who 
had been living with a San Jose family for about eight months. The 
mother went to work, leaving the youngest child, 10-year old Victoria, 
alone with Anderson. During the course of the day, he had stabbed her 
some sixty times, seemingly blindly. Some of the stabbings took place 
after death. There was no evidence of a sexual assault. Anderson did not 
attempt to hide the body or flee. The California Supreme Court rejected 
a finding of first-degree murder. In order to determine premeditation, the 
court stated that it would be necessary to find: (1) prior planning—a pur-
poseful pattern of behavior leading to the killing; (2) subsequent ac-
tions—disposing of the corpse or fleeing; (3) and the existence of a rela-
tionship between the perpetrator and the victim.   
 
1JAY KATZ, ET AL., PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY, & THE LAW 2 (1967).  
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Reducing the conviction to second-degree murder, the court said 
the killing was not purposeful, no attempt was made to cover up the 
crime, and there were few prior interactions between the ten-year-old girl 
and Anderson. Anderson did not set out well-ordered plans to commit the 
homicide. But what does the repeating stabbing suggest? Mindless im-
mediate impulsivity or a long-standing intent that can only be dissipated 
through unrestrained violence? Anderson was discovered in the house 
where the murder took place—according to the trial court—constantly 
washing his hands. Was this his version of appropriate subsequent ac-
tions rather than hiding the crime? Was there a need to purify, to free 
himself from the blood? And the California Supreme Court finds, quite 
remarkably, that there was no evidence of “any prior relationship or be-
havior with the victim from which the jury could infer that defendant en-
tertained a ‘motive’ for killing his victim.”3   
What does the court mean when it says (quite astonishingly) 
there was no relationship? It may have been a fantasy, an obsession, an 
acting out of some sort of conjured up intense connection, but most cer-
tainly, at least for Anderson, there must have been a relationship. The 
California court refuses to probe beneath the surface—adhering to the 
greatest of all legal fictions, the fiction of rational choice. The psychoan-
alytic enterprise, Anne tells us, is at its core a signpost warning that in-
tellectual hydrofoils should be wary of deep waters.   
Freud put it this way in his New Introductory Lectures: “If we wish 
to do justice to the specificity of the psyche, we must not seek to render 
it through linear contours, as in a drawing or in primitive painting . . . We 
have to allow what we have kept apart to blur.”4  He identified the psy-
choanalytic project as “making the psyche intelligible [anschaulich].”5 But 
such taking into account subjectivity is all well and good when we are 
 
3 Id. at 33. 
4 Sigmund Freud, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS (Neue Folge der 
Vorlesung zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse) (Simon Weber trans. 1993) in THE LEG-
END OF FREUD 33 (2000). 
5 Id.  
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speaking about individual minds. I am reminded of Jerome Groopman’s 
wonderful book How Doctors Think—which urges physicians to be slow, 
deliberative, and to look for zebras (his image) that might seem like ordi-
nary horses.6  Groopman’s notion of medicine is utopian: every puzzling 
disease gets its own Dr. Gregory House with his team of young acolytes. 
If Congress would simply pass the Unaffordable Care Act to pay for all 
this, then we would be in marvelous shape. True, an unconscious mind 
is a terrible thing to waste. Yet what do we make of the psychoanalytic 
enterprise in the realm of criminal justice? 
Anne, of course, knows we live in a very different world. Around 
94% of state criminal convictions and 97% of federal prosecutions are 
plea bargains. The late William Stuntz describes the irony of how proce-
dures intended to protect defendants turned into the procedural machin-
ery of the incarceration state. Psychiatrists are often agents of the state 
criminal justice system, even administering forced psychotropic drugs for 
the purposes of readying those with mental infirmities for criminal pro-
ceedings or even capital punishment—though there are those who won-
der whether the administration of Haldol for the restoration of compe-
tency in order for a prisoner to be executed is a violation of the 
Hippocratic Oath.7 Forensics, not psychoanalysis, seems attractive as a 
shortcut to the truth. A recent case in Wisconsin unsuccessfully chal-
lenged the use by a judge in sentencing of a secret proprietary software 
called COMPAS.8 Using algorithms, the software determined that the de-
fendant posed a high risk of recidivism and was a danger to the commu-
nity, and based on that report, the court sentenced him to six years in 
prison for evading arrest and operating a motor vehicle without the 
owner’s consent.9  
 
6 JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 127 (2008). 
7 Rhonda K. Jenkins, Fit to Die: Drug-Induced Competency for the Purpose of Execution, 
20 S. ILL. U.L.J. 149 (1995); Kacie McCoy Daugherty, Synthetic Sanity: The Ethics and 
Legality of Using Psychotropic Medications to Render Death Row Inmates Competent for 
Execution, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 715 (2001). 
8 State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, 371 Wis. 2d 235, 881 N.W.2d 749.  
9 Id. at 757.  
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Anne’s book shifts back and forth between two ways of thinking 
about the relevance of psychoanalysis of law. These may be best identi-
fied using the terminology of the French legal scholar Pierre Legendre. 
On one hand, we need in Legendre’s terminology to capture a deeper 
understanding of the legal subject (sujet). What does it mean to probe 
the subconscious of offenders such as Anderson or those entangled in 
custody disputes? Yet her other theme is embodied in Legendre’s term 
anthropologie dogmatique—what presumptions about consciousness 
might be embedded in the fabric of legal doctrine? 
In both cases, we need to know when law should be treated as a 
matter of rational choices considered by individuals and when we must 
embark on the psychoanalytic turn. Criminal law is a form of public law. 
It poses issues of social governance much like constitutional law. Its his-
torical past—at least in the state’s context—has been intertwined in the 
late eighteenth century with our claims to sovereignty. Susanna Blumen-
thal brilliantly shows how our political architecture rests upon the shared 
cognitive touchstones of the rational mind. There is almost a touching 
belief that individuals are able to make moral choices except in such rare 
cases as duress—where a person of ordinary moral fortitude could not 
resist becoming the agent of a criminal figure—or extreme emotional dis-
tress—where a sudden disorienting intervention sends the rational moral 
compass off kilter. Yet Anne tells us that criminal law is often the law of 
intimacy. A maelstrom of emotions emerge around closeness: children 
and partners, lovers, and enemies. And it is the dilemma of intimacy, 
what Anne refers to as the “dynamic unconscious”—an intimacy in the 
criminal law sphere with emotions so powerful that that might undergo 
some sort of alchemy, and turn to violence. 
Anne’s conclusion is certainly the most intriguing part of the vol-
ume. Who should be deploying psychoanalysis as a mode of inquiry? Is 
it those drafting statutes such as the norms governing incest? Do we ex-
pect judges to pose psychoanalytically informed questions much as we 
expect fancy footnotes in doctrine on a very select number of cases? I 
can also imagine how discussions of the unconscious might slip into the 
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sentencing phase of a criminal trial. Must lawyers be trained how to han-
dle transference when dealing with family law clients? Do we expect self-
knowledge to be a goal of a felon (those masters, so often, of narcissistic 
defenses)? Or, as Anne also suggests, is psychoanalysis an essential 
part of every citizen’s formative education—a kind of Dewey on the psy-
choanalytic couch? 
Katz, Goldstein, and Dershowitz’s half-century old treatise begins 
with the defensive, if any. But the treatise’s conclusion was even more 
telling—there has been a remarkably limited grappling by law with the 
unconscious. This is a classic example of one of those Freudian lücken—
gaps—where absence speaks volumes. It is a long time to anticipate a 
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